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Abstract
This paper introduces a new and ubiquitous framework for establishing achievability results in
network information theory (NIT) problems. The framework uses random binning arguments and is
based on a duality between channel and source coding problems. Further, the framework uses pmf
approximation arguments instead of counting and typicality. This allows for proving coordination
and strong secrecy problems where certain statistical conditions on the distribution of random vari-
ables need to be satisfied. These statistical conditions include independence between messages and
eavesdropper’s observations in secrecy problems and closeness to a certain distribution (usually, i.i.d.
distribution) in coordination problems. One important feature of the framework is to enable one to
add an eavesdropper and obtain a result on the secrecy rates “for free.”
We make a case for generality of the framework by studying examples in the variety of settings
containing channel coding, lossy source coding, joint source-channel coding, coordination, strong se-
crecy, feedback and relaying. In particular, by investigating the framework for the lossy source coding
problem over broadcast channel, it is shown that the new framework provides a simple alternative
scheme to hybrid coding scheme. Also, new results on secrecy rate region (under strong secrecy cri-
terion) of wiretap broadcast channel and wiretap relay channel are derived. In a set of accompanied
papers, we have shown the usefulness of the framework to establish achievability results for coordina-
tion problems including interactive channel simulation, coordination via relay and channel simulation
via another channel.
Index terms— Random binning, achievability, network information theory, strong secrecy, duality.
1 Introduction
Random coding and random binning are widely utilized in achievability proofs of the network information
theory (NIT) problems. Random coding is a coding technique that is commonly used to prove the
existence of a good codebook (which is a subset of the product set X n[1:T ] :=
∏T
i=1X ni ), while random
binning is a coding technique that partitions the product set into bins with desired properties. Existing
achievability proofs for NIT problems are based on a repeated use of random coding and random binning.
In this paper, we provide an achievability framework which uses only random binning, by converting
NIT problems into certain source coding problems. Let us begin by the problem of sending a message
M over a channel p(y|x). Traditional random coding considers an encoder Xn(M,F ) and a decoder
Mˆ(Y n, F ) where F is a common randomness, independent of M , available to both the transmitter and
the receiver. R.v. F represents the random nature of codebook generation. Since the probability of
error is evaluated by averaging over all realizations of F , one can find f such that Xn(M,F = f) and
Mˆ(Y n, F = f) form appropriate encoder and decoder. In our framework, we depart from this by first
generating n i.i.d. copies of Xn and Y n; then we take both F and M to be functions of Xn such that F
becomes nearly independent of M . Note that we still have the property that p(yn|xn, F = f) = p(yn|xn)
and p(m|F = f) ≈ p(m) meaning that Xn(M,F = f) and Mˆ(Y n, F = f) are legitimate choices as
stochastic encoder and decoder. We construct F and M as random partitions (binnings) of Xn. The
question then arises that under what conditions two random bin indices are independent (as in the case
of F and M), and what is the sufficient condition for recovering Xn from Y n and a bin index F .
In Section 2, we discuss the preceding argument and further bring up a key and novel duality between
the channel coding problem and secret-key agreement (SK) problem (in the source-model sense) by
∗The authors are with the Information Systems and Security Lab (ISSL), Department of Electrical Engineering, Sharif University
of Technology, Tehran, Iran (e-mails: yassaee@ee.sharif.edu; {aref,aminzadeh}@sharif.edu). This work is supported by Iran-NSF under
grant No. 92-32575. This paper was presented in part at ISIT 2012.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
20
3.
07
30
v3
  [
cs
.IT
]  
22
 A
ug
 20
14
interpreting M as the key and F as the pubic message. In particular we discuss how an achievability
proof for each of these problems can be converted to an achievability proof for the other one. It turns
out that the two questions in the end of the previous paragraph relate to the secrecy and reliability
constraints in the SK agreement problem.
Since the SK agreement problem is a source coding problem with secrecy constraint, and has been
previously studied using random binning ideas, the duality gives a proof for the point to point channel
coding problem by means of random binning only.
To associate an appropriate source coding problem to a given problem, one needs to answer questions
similar to the ones for the point-to-point channel coding problem, i.e. the independence and reliability
constraints (for point-to-point channel coding problem, we had the independence constraint on F and
M and the reliability constraint of recovering Xn from Y n and F ). To answer these questions in a
more general framework, in Section 3, we prove two main theorems on approximating the joint pmf (or
statistics) of the bin indices in a distributed random binning. We study properties of random binning
in two extreme regimes, namely, when the binning rates are low and high. In the first case, we observe
that if the rates of a distributed random binning are sufficiently small, the bin indices are nearly jointly
independent, uniformly distributed and independent of a non-binned source Zn. We call this theorem
“Output Statistics of Random Binning (OSRB) theorem”. This result generalizes the one for the channel
intrinsic randomness [5]. The second case is the SW region, which shows that if the rates of distributed
binning are sufficiently large, the outputs of random binning are enough to recover the sources. Since
the framework deals with the output statistics of random binning, we call the framework as OSRB
framework.
1.1 Particular features of OSRB
The proposed framework differs from traditional techniques in the following significant ways:
• It uses random binning only.
• It brings part of the randomness of random codebook generation from the background into the
foreground as an explicit random variable.
• It is not based on notions of “counting” size of typical sets, or typicality decoding. Instead, it uses
probability approximation in the sense of vanishing total variation distance. This has important
implications in problems of secrecy and coordination, as discussed in subsection 1.2.
• The technique allows us to add secrecy for free. Thus, for instance, going from traditional point-
to-point communication problem to the wiretap channel problem is immediate.
• The advantage of the conversion to an appropriate source coding problem is that we only have one
copy of the random variables; all the messages and preshared randomness are next constructed as
random bins of these i.i.d. rv’s. However a direct approach to the channel coding problem requires
dealing with a large codebook containing lots of codeword sequences.
• While the traditional techniques view superposition coding and Marton coding as distinct cod-
ing constructions, in our framework the two constructions are nothing but two different ways of
specifying the set of i.i.d. rv’s we are binning. Thus, the new framework unifies the two coding
strategies, for it only uses random binning.
1.2 Advantages of the proposed method
The proposed method has a simple structure (using only random binning), and can solve some problems
much easier than the traditional techniques; see [35, 36] for two examples that are not included in this
manuscript. These examples consider the problems of channel simulation and coordination. In [35],
we find an exact computable characterization of a multi-round channel simulation problem for which
only inner and outer bounds were known previously. In coordination problems [6], we want to generate
random variables whose joint distribution is close to a desired i.i.d. distribution in total variation distance.
Traditional techniques (such as packing and covering lemmas) commonly address the probability of error
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events. This is not general enough to cover all of the total variation distance constraints that show up in
the coordination problems. In such cases, one has to come up with new proof techniques. One particular
case is the resolvability (or soft covering) lemma used by Cuff (see [7, Lemma IV. 1], [8, 9]).
In addition to what discussed above, the framework leads to more rigorous and simpler proofs for
secrecy problems. In secrecy problems one has to deal with certain equivocation rates. Generally
speaking there are two main techniques for proving lower bounds on equivocation rates: one is to prove
existence of “good” codebooks with given properties, which are then used to compute the equivocation
rates. This approach was originally used by Csiszar and Korner in [10]. The second approach is to
compute the expected value of equivocation rates over codebooks, and prove existence of a “good”
codebook with large equivocation rate (in the same way that a codebook with small probability of error
is identified). Some existing works on secrecy follow the second approach in a non-rigorous way. Instead
of defining a random variable for the random codebook and conditioning the equivocation rates by that,
they use the unconditioned distribution to calculate the equivocation rates. The recent book by El
Gamal and Kim [1] uses the second approach in a rigorous way. However, in some scenarios, calculation
of equivocation rates conditioned on the codebook random variable can be involved. We observe that
the OSRB framework leads to simple proofs in such cases. In fact, we show that whenever one solves a
problem without secrecy constraint using OSRB framework, he can get a solution for this problem with
addition of a secrecy constraint for free! Moreover, we can directly prove strong secrecy results for multi
terminal scenarios.
1.3 Related previous works
Some connections between certain source coding and channel coding problems have been observed in
previous works. Slepian and Wolf, in their seminal paper on the lossless source coding [2], interpreted
the achievability of the rate R = H(X|Y ) for compressing the source Xn at rate R to a destination with
access to the source Y n, through a channel coding problem. In contrast, Csiszar and Korner, obtained
an achievability proof for multiple access channels (MAC) through the distributed source coding problem
of Slepian and Wolf [3]. In a recent work [4], Renes and Renner showed the achievability of the channel
capacity via a combination of Slepian-Wolf (SW) coding and privacy amplification. The main theme in
these works is that the set of sequences mapped to the same index through SW coding constitutes a
good channel code, and hence, we have a decomposition of the product set into the channel codebooks.
However, these works do not provide a systematic and ubiquitous framework for proving achievability
results.
Some of the ideas in this work were inspired by the work of Cuff [7]. These include use of pmfs as
random variables, preserving joint statistics and reverse encoders. However the two frameworks have
significant differences in terms of codebook construction and proofs. We consider our framework simpler
and more general for the following reason: Cuff’s framework is not easily applicable to complicated
network structures (such as coordination with relay [36]), since if one were to extend Cuff’s “soft-
covering” lemma to these scenarios, one has to define various mutual soft-covering lemmas and various
codebook constructions (just like the traditional mutual covering lemmas). Further, binning provides a
common framework and bypasses the need for proving mutual covering lemmas.
Our approach for proving strong secrecy results resembles the resolvability techniques [12, 13], but
to best of our knowledge, resolvability techniques are not developed for multi terminal scenarios except
for one work on MACs by Steinberg [14]. The latter result has been used in [15] and [16] to prove
strong secrecy results for multiple-access wiretap channels and two-way wiretap channels, respectively.
However our approach is able to deal with strong secrecy in general multi terminal scenarios. There
is also another approach for proving strong secrecy results using the ideas of privacy amplification of
Maurer and Wolf [11]. In this technique, one first proves weak secrecy for a problem and then employs
privacy amplification to extract secret message or key in the strong sense. We are not aware if this
technique has been extended to the multi-terminal setting. Regardless, in this technique one needs to
prove weak secrecy which may be difficult in general multi-terminal setting using traditional techniques.
In contrast, the OSRB framework leads to a simple and direct proof for strong secrecy in multi-terminal
setting.
There are connections between the OSRB framework and recent hybrid coding approach of Minero,
Lim and Kim [30]. In fact, the OSRB framework implicitly employs hybrid coding by its construction.
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This is discussed in details in Remark 8.
It was brought to our attention by Muramatsu that a structure similar to OSRB based on random
binning (more generally, hash functions) has been used in his works [17, 18]. While the use of random
binning in the works of Muramatsu et al. is similar to ours (in particular its use of binning to get
Marton coding), obtaining superposition coding part of Marton’s inner bound via binning has been
left as an open problem (this can be done by binning nested sets of variables in our framework) [19].
More importantly, our construction of stochastic encoders-decoders (based on pmf decompositions and
using the terms in the decomposition to define encoders) differs from the ones in these works. Further,
Muramatsu et al.’s works use typicality lemmas and counting approximation tools, whereas we use pmf
approximation together with the idea of preserving joint pmf among rv’s in the source coding and channel
coding forms of a problem. Lastly, we apply our framework to a much wider range of problems including
those with feedback and relay, and also prove new achievability results. On the other hand, Muramatsu
et al.’s works are interested in designing practical codes, whereas we are not.
The OSRB framework is inspired by certain duality between channel coding and the source model SK
problem. Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of duality in the literature, namely functional duality
and operational duality. Functional duality is the duality between formal expressions of the primal and
dual problems, e.g. the duality between the mutual information terms in the channel capacity and rate-
distortion functions. This type of duality was first pointed out by Shannon between source and channel
coding problems [20]. Other examples include duality between source coding with side information and
channel coding with state information [21, 22], duality between packing and covering lemmas and binning
and multicoding [1]. The functional duality does not provide an explicit relation between solutions of
the primal and the dual problems. On the other hand, operational duality provides a way to construct
a solution (a code) for the primal problem using a solution for the dual problem. Operational duality
was explored in [23] for lossy compression and channel coding problems, showing that a certain channel
decoder can be used as a lossy compressor. The duality used in the OSRB is an operational one.
1.4 Organization
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we illustrate the main idea of converting a channel coding
problem to a source coding problem by showing an interesting duality between the channel coding and
SK agreement problems. We also discuss in Subsection 2.2 how one can obtain secrecy for free from the
proof for a problem without secrecy constraint. In Section 3, we state the main theorems to approximate
pmfs. In Section 4, we begin by demonstrating our approach for some primitive problems of NIT, i.e.
channel coding and lossy source coding problems, before getting into our new results. Moreover, we
show that the achievability proof for channel coding problem can be extended for free to an achievability
proof for wiretap channel. We also illustrate how our framework can be used to prove channel (network)
synthesis problems by applying our framework to the original channel synthesis problem [7], studied by
Cuff, and apply our approach to complicated networks with more than two users. In Subsection 4.6 we
apply our framework to obtain a new achievable rate region for the problem of three receiver wiretap
broadcast channel under a strong secrecy criterion. In Subsection 4.7, we re-prove the achievable rate
region for the problem of distributed lossy compression, due to Berger and Tung. In Subsection 4.8,
the OSRB framework is applied to the problem of lossy coding over broadcast channels. In Subsection
4.9, we show the applicability of OSRB framework to multi-hop networks. To do this, we consider relay
channel and re-prove the noisy network coding (NNC) [31] inner bound for this problem. We also easily
extend the proof to get an extension of NNC inner bound for the problem of wiretap relay channel with
strong secrecy criterion, which was not known before. In Section 5, we discuss connections between our
framework and the covering lemma in a multivariate setup by observing that the set of typical sequences
can be decomposed into covering codebooks.
1.5 Notations
In this paper, we use XS to denote (Xj : j ∈ S), pUA to denote the uniform distribution over the set A
and p(xn) to denote the the i.i.d. pmf
∏n
i=1 p(xi), unless otherwise stated. The total variation between
two pmf’s p and q on the same alphabet X , is defined by ‖p(x)− q(x)‖1 := 12
∑
x |p(x)− q(x)|.
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Remark 1. Similar to [7], in this work we frequently use the concept of random pmfs which we denote
by capital letters (e.g. PX). For any countable set X , let ∆X be the probability simplex for distributions
on X . A random pmf PX is a probability distribution over ∆X . In other words, if we use Ω to denote the
sample space, the mapping ω ∈ Ω 7→ PX(x;ω) is a random variable for all x ∈ X such that PX(x;ω) ≥ 0
and
∑
x PX(x;ω) = 1 for all ω. Thus, ω 7→ PX(·;ω) is a vector of random variables, which we denote
by PX . We can definite PX,Y on product set X × Y in a similar way. We note that we can continue
to use the law of total probability with random pmfs (e.g. to write PX(x) =
∑
y PXY (x, y) meaning that
PX(x;ω) =
∑
y PXY (x, y;ω) for all ω) and the conditional probability pmfs (e.g. to write PY |X(y|x) =
PXY (x,y)
PX(x)
meaning that PY |X(y|x;ω) = PXY (x,y;ω)PX(x;ω) for all ω).
2 Motivation
The key technique used in the OSRB is to covert an primary problem to a dual problem such that the
statistics (i.e. the joint distribution of the r.v.’s) of the primary problem and the dual problem are almost
identical. The dual problem is more tractable than the primary one. Solving the dual problem implies
a solution for the primary problem. We illustrate this technique by showing a duality between channel
coding for a point to point (PTP) channel and the secret key agreement (source model) problem. Indeed,
we show how one can use the (Shannon’s) achievability proof of channel coding to obtain an achievability
proof for the secret key problem and vice versa. Indeed, this duality yields previously unknown results
about the source model problem as discussed in Remark 2.
2.1 Duality between channel coding and secret key agreement
2.1.1 Shannon’s achievability proof results in a SK achievability proof
Consider Shannon’s achievability proof for the problem of sending a uniform message M of rate R over
a DMC channel pY |X . In his proof, Shannon used a random codebook C = {Xn(m)}2nRm=1 in which
the codewords are generated independently according to an i.i.d. pmf
∏n
i=1 pX(xi). The codebook is
shared between the encoder and the decoder. Thus, the random codebook can be viewed as a shared
randomness. Given the message M and the codebook C, the encoder sends Xn(M, C) over the channel.
The decoder uses his observation Y n and the codebook C to estimate the transmitted message. Shannon
showed that the error probability, averaged over the random codebooks, is small; therefore there exists
a good codebook with a negligible error probability. Let pMCXnY n be the induced pmf on the message,
codebook, channel input and the channel output. The following observations are useful in the rest of
this subsection:
• The codebook C and the message M are independent; thus, pMC = pUMpC . Hence, conditioned on
an instance of the codebook, the uniformity of the message is not disturbed.
• While for a fixed codebook the channel input distribution is uniform over the codewords, the i.i.d.
generation of codebook makes the input distribution i.i.d., that is, pXn(x
n) =
∏
i pX(xi).
• The Markov chain M, C −Xn − Y n holds and the channel is DMC. Thus, the joint distribution of
channel input and channel output is i.i.d., that is, pXnY n(x
n, yn) =
∏
i pXY (xi, yi). Moreover we
have pMCXnY n = pUMpCpXn|M,CpY n|Xn = pXnpMC|XnpY n|Xn .
These observations are illustrated in the top diagram of Fig. 1. To convert Shannon’s achievability
proof to a SK achievability proof, we proceed as follows. Since pMCXn = pXnpMC|Xn , one can think of
this as passing an i.i.d. source Xn through a reverse encoder pXnpMC|Xn to obtain M and C. This is
depicted in the bottom diagram of Fig. 1 where we have changed the direction of the arrows to reflect
this change of order. Moreover, as (Xn, Y n) are jointly i.i.d., one can consider pMC|Xn as an encoder for
the SK problem in which C and M are the public message and key, respectively. For decoding, we take
the decoder of channel coding problem and use it for the SK problem. Observe that the joint distribution
of r.v.’s in the channel coding problem and the SK problem are equal; thus these models are equivalent.
In particular,
• The key M and the public message C are independent.
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CM E Xn pY |X D M
Y n
pUMpCpXn |M,CpY n |Xn = pXnY npM,C|Xn
C
M pM,C|Xn Xn pY |X D M
Y n
pXnY npM,C|Xn
Figure 1: (Top) Shannon’s achievability proof with random codebook as a pre-shared randomness. Here, the
codebook and the message are independent. Randomness in the codebook makes the input and output jointly
i.i.d. (Bottom) Source model SK problem with the i.i.d. correlated sources Xn and Y n. Reversing the encoder gives
a feasible encoder for the SK problem, in which M and C take the roles of key and public message, respectively.
Since the joint distribution of all r.v.’s is preserved, the uniformity of the message (key) and the independence
between key (message) and public message (random codebook) are also preserved.
• The error probability of decoding of the key M is equal to that of channel coding. Thus, if the
error probability of the channel coding is negligible, then the error probability of SK problem is
also negligible. This shows that the rate I(X;Y ) is achievable.
To sum this up, Shannon’s achievability proof results in a SK achievability proof. Further, we have
complete independence between the key and the public message.
Remark 2. Although the preceding argument is used to prove the SK achievability result in the asymptotic
regime for the i.i.d. sources, it can be applied to one shot (single-use) regime. To see this, one can replace
the i.i.d. sources Xn and Y n with sources X and Y , generate codebook according to pX instead of the
i.i.d. pXn and use pMC|X instead of pMC|Xn. Then, the error probability of Shannon’s achievability proof
and SK achievability proof are the same and we have complete independence between the key and the
public message. In addition, applying this result to general sources in the asymptotic regime implies that
the key-rate I(X;Y ) is achievable using its achievability for channel coding with general input-output
(see [25] for a definition of a general input-output channel). This potentially improves on the previous
random binning bound H(X)−H(X|Y ) in [5]. More importantly, this proof technique is not restricted
to discrete sources and can be applied to any correlated sources with abstract alphabets.
2.1.2 SK achievability proof results in an achievability proof for channel coding problem
The traditional SK achievability proof is based on a random binning argument. Similarly, we show that
a random binning argument can be used to prove the achievability part of the PTP channel coding
problem. In SK agreement problem, we have i.i.d. copies of correlated sources (Xn, Y n). The traditional
SK achievability proof uses two random bin indices of the source Xn to obtain the public message F
and the key M . The relation among r.v.’s is depicted in the top diagram of Fig. 2. The random bin
F serves as a Slepian-Wolf (SW) index with rate RF > H(X|Y ). It enables the receiver to recover Xn
with high probability. Through this, it can recover M as a bin index of Xn. Next, we consider the
channel coding counterpart. Again, one can interpret the key as the message and the public message as
the shared randomness. We use reverse encoder PXn|MF obtained from random binning as a stochastic
encoder for the channel coding problem. Also, we use the decoder of SK problem as a channel decoder.
The relation among r.v.’s in the channel coding counterpart is depicted in the bottom diagram of Fig.
2. If the joint distribution of M and F is equal to the PMF (induced by random binning), then the
joint distribution of all r.v.’s in the SK problem and its channel coding counterpart are equal which
implies that the error probability of channel coding problem is negligible. To get away with shared
randomness, one can find a good instance F = f of the shared randomness such that Pr(error|F = f)
is also negligible. However, conditioned on F = f , the distribution PM |F=f may be disturbed and it is
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FM PXn |MF Xn pY |X D Xn ⇒ M
Y n
pUMPFPXn |MF pY n |Xn
F
M B Xn pY |X D Xn ⇒ M
Y n
pXnY nPM,F |Xn = PMFPXn |MF pY n |Xn
Figure 2: (Top) SK achievability using random binning. F is a SW bin index with rate RF >
H(X|Y ). This results in the reliable decoding of the source Xn and consequently reliable decoding
of the key M . (Bottom) Channel coding counterpart of SK problem. Reversing the encoder gives a
feasible encoder for the channel coding problem, in which M and F take the role of message and shared
randomness, respectively. The SK problem and its channel coding counterpart are equivalent, if the
secrecy requirements of SK problem are satisfied; that is, PMF ≈ pUMPF . The constraint RF + RM <
H(X) is sufficient to guarantee this approximation.
not necessarily uniform. Therefore, we are interested to finding constraint on the rates of M and F such
that the following properties hold:
• M is almost a uniform random variable,
• M and F are almost independent. This ensures that conditioned on an instance F = f , the
uniformity of the message is not disturbed.
These two properties are the secrecy requirements of the SK problem. Using a result of [24, 5], one can
see that these two properties hold as long as RF +RM < H(X).
The above argument is a common one used in the OSRB framework. We always associate a source
coding problem to a given problem, calling it “the source coding side of problem”. In this simple example,
the top diagram of Fig. 2 is the source coding side of the channel coding problem. We then convert
the associated source coding side to the main problem using appropriate reverse encoders, with one
exception; here we have added a shared randomness to the main problem. We then find constraints that
the joint distribution of r.v.’s in the main problem and the source coding side are approximately equal.
Next we find constraints that satisfy the desired properties such as reliability and secrecy in the source
coding side. Finally, we remove the shared randomness without disturbing the desired properties.
The advantage of conversion to a source coding problem is that in the source coding side of the
problem we only have one copy of i.i.d. random variables. In the source coding side of the problem
discussed above, we started from a single i.i.d. copy of Xn, Y n. All the other rv’s (i.e. M and F ) are
random bins of these i.i.d. rv’s. However if we were to directly attack the channel coding problem, we had
to create a codebook of size 2nR containing lots of xn sequences. This may not seem significant in this
simple channel coding example. However, in problems involving multi-round interactive communication
with several auxiliary random variables (e.g. [4]), it is desirable to have just a single i.i.d. repetition
of all the original and auxiliary random variables in our framework (rather than having many i.i.d.
copies of these random variables related to each other through superposition or Marton coding type
structures). Once we take a single i.i.d. copy, all the messages and pre-shared randomness (such as
F ) can be constructed as random bins of these i.i.d. rv’s. Traditional coding techniques start with the
messages and then create the many codewords. Here, we are reversing the order by starting from a single
i.i.d. copy of the original and auxiliary rv’s and constructing the messages as bin indices afterwards.
2.2 Secrecy is free!
One advantage of the proposed framework is to solve secrecy problems for free!, in the sense that once a
problem without secrecy constraint is solved, the corresponding problem with secrecy constraint can be
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FM PXn |MF Xn pY Z|X D Xn ⇒ M
Eve
Y n
Zn, F
pUMPFPXn |MF pY nZn |Xn
F
M B Xn pY Z|X D Xn ⇒ M
Eve
Y n
Zn, F
pXnY nZnPM,F |Xn = PMFPXn |MF pY nZn |Xn
Figure 3: (Top) Source coding side of the wiretap channel. Here, the eavesdropper has access to the shared
randomness F in addition to channel output Zn. (Bottom) Wiretap channel. We need to have equivalence
between wiretap channel and its source coding side and the secrecy constraint M⊥(F,Zn). For these to happen,
it suffices to have mutual independence among M , F and Zn. This holds as long as RF +RM < H(X|Z).
solved with minor modifications. To illustrate this, we show how the achievability proof of the channel
coding problem using random binning gives an achievability proof for wiretap channel problem for free.
Consider the diagrams in the Fig. 3 which are the same as the ones in the Fig. 2 for channel coding
problem with one exception; we have added eavesdropper to this figure. Following the argument used
in the subsection 2.1.2, we have the equivalence between the source coding side of the problem (the
top diagram) and the wiretap channel (the bottom diagram), i.e. the joint distribution of all r.v.’s are
approximately equal, as long as RF + RM < H(X). Thus, it suffices to ensure the secrecy constraint
for the source coding side and it will automatically hold for the channel coding side of the problem.
Since F is a shared randomness, eavesdropper has access to it. Thus, the secrecy requirement is the
independence between M and (F,Zn) available at the eavesdropper (it is worth to note that conditioned
on an instance of F = f , the independence between M and Zn conditioned on F = f is satisfied.).
In fact, we obtain a constraint on the rates of M and F such that M , F and Zn are almost mutually
independent. This immediately implies the desired independence. It turns out that this condition holds
as long as RF +RM < H(X|Z). Comparing this with the constraint RF +RM < H(X) for the channel
coding problem without secrecy constraint (coming from the independence of M and F without Zn),
we observe that Z is only added to the conditioning part of the entropy in the constraint. This is
a common phenomenon in secrecy problems. Having solved a problem without secrecy using OSRB,
the corresponding problem with secrecy can be solved by adding eavesdropper’s information to the
conditioning part of appropriate constraints appearing in the solution of the problem without secrecy;
thus, our remark that secrecy is free in the OSRB framework.
Finally, the reliability constraint RF > H(X|Y ) and the secrecy constraint RF + RM < H(X|Z)
give the achievability of the rate RM < I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z). The achievability of more general formula
RM < I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;Z) can be proved using the combination of channel prefixing technique and the
above argument.
3 Output statistics of random binning
Let (X[1:T ], Z) be a discrete memoryless correlated sources distributed according to a joint pmf pX[1:T ],Z
on a countably infinite set
∏T
i=1Xi × Z. A distributed random binning consists of a set of random
mappings Bi : X ni → [1 : 2nRi ], i ∈ [1 : T ], in which Bi maps each sequence of X ni uniformly and
independently to the set [1 : 2nRi ]. We denote the random variable Bt(Xnt ) by Bt. Also we denote the
realization of Bt by bt. A random distributed binning induces the following random pmf on the set
X n[1:T ] ×Zn ×
∏T
t=1[1 : 2
nRt ],
P (xn[1:T ], z
n, b[1:T ]) = p(x
n
[1:T ], z
n)
T∏
t=1
1{Bt(xnt ) = bt},
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where we have used capital P to indicate the probabilistic random binning, implying that the pmf
induced on xn[1:T ], z
n, b[1:T ] is random. One can easily verify that (B1, · · · , BT ) are uniformly distributed
and mutually independent of Zn in the mean, that is
EP (zn, b[1:T ]) = 2−n
∑T
t=1Rtp(zn) = p(zn)
T∏
t=1
pU[1:2nRt ](bt).
The following theorem finds constraints on the rate-tuple (R1, · · · , RT ), such that the preceding
observation about the mean holds for almost any realization of the distributed binning. We will be using
this theorem frequently in the proofs. A more general form of this theorem is provided and proved in
Appendix A.
Theorem 1. If for each S ⊆ [1 : T ], the following constraint holds∑
t∈S
Rt < H(XS |Z), (1)
then as n goes to infinity, we have
EB
∥∥∥∥∥P (zn, b[1:T ])− p(zn)
T∏
t=1
pU[1:2nRt ](bt)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
→ 0, (2)
where B is the set of all random mappings, i.e. B = {Bi : i ∈ [1 : T ]}.
Remark 3. In [5], the channel intrinsic randomness was defined “as the maximum random bit rate
that can be extracted from a channel output independently of an input with known statistics”. One can
generalize this definition to the broadcast channel pX[1:T ]|Z , in the sense of finding T strings of random
bits with rates (R1, · · · , RT ) such that the i− th string is extracted individually from the i− th channel
output Xni , while making sure that these random strings are mutually independent of each other and
of the channel input Zn. Theorem 1 gives an achievable rate region for this scenario and implies that
random binning is sufficient to prove the achievability.1
Sometimes we only need the independence of one random bin from other random bins and Zn. The
following corollary provides sufficient conditions for the independence of B1 from (B2, · · · , BT , Zn). The
proof is provided in Appendix B.
Corollary 1. Let V be an arbitrary subset of [2 : T ]. If for each S ⊆ [2 : T ]−V, the following constraint
holds
R1 +
∑
t∈S
Rt < H(X1XS |ZXV), (3)
then as n goes to infinity, we have
EB
∥∥P (zn, b[1:T ])− pU (b1)P (zn, b[2:T ])∥∥1 → 0. (4)
Theorem 1 enables us to approximate the pmf P (zn, b1:T ). We now consider another region for which
we can approximate a specified pmf. This region is the Slepian-Wolf region for reconstructing Xn[1:T ] in
the presence of (B1:T , Z
n) at the decoder. As in the achievability proof of the [1, Section 10.3.2], we can
define a decoder with respect to any fixed distributed binning. We denote the decoder by the random
conditional pmf PSW (xˆn[1:T ]|zn, b[1:T ]) (note that since the decoder is a function, this pmf takes only two
values, 0 and 1).2 Now we write the Slepian-Wolf theorem in the following equivalent form.
1In fact, [5] considered the case for general channel with general input and the results is based on the information
spectrum methods. The achievability proof in [5] follows from [24, Theorem 1] whose proof is based on graph-coloring. The
proof of Theorem 1 can be easily extended to this general setting, in which one should substitute average entropy with
the spectral inf-entropy (which is defined in [25]), to get the result for this general case. Our proof is based on a simple
application of Jensen’s inequality.
2For a Slepian-Wolf decoder that uses a jointly typical decoder, PSW (xˆn[1:T ]|zn, b[1:T ]) = 1 if xˆn[1:T ] is the only jointly
typical sequence with zn in the bin b[1:T ]. If the unique jointly typical sequence in the bin does not exist, then xˆ
n
[1:T ] is
taken to be a fixed arbitrary sequence.
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Lemma 1. If for each S ⊆ [1 : T ], the following constraint holds∑
t∈S
Rt > H(XS |XSc , Z), (5)
then as n goes to infinity, we have
EB
∥∥∥P (xn[1:T ], zn, xˆn[1:T ])− p(xn[1:T ], zn)1{xˆn[1:T ] = xn[1:T ]}∥∥∥
1
→ 0.
Proof. From the definition of the total variation, we know that ‖p(x)− q(x)‖1 =
∑
x:p(x)>q(x)[p(x)−q(x)].
Using this property we can write
E
∥∥∥P (xn[1:T ], zn, xˆn[1:T ])− p(xn[1:T ], zn)1{xˆn[1:T ] = xn[1:T ]}∥∥∥
1
(a)
= E
∑
xn
[1:T ]
,zn,xˆn
[1:T ]
:
xˆn
[1:T ]
6=xn
[1:T ]
P (xn[1:T ], z
n, xˆn[1:T ])
= EP (Xˆn[1:T ] 6= Xn[1:T ])→ 0, (6)
where (a) follows from the fact that whenever P (xn[1:T ], z
n, xˆn[1:T ]) > p(x
n
[1:T ], z
n)1{xˆn[1:T ] = xn[1:T ]} we must
have 1{xˆn[1:T ] = xn[1:T ]} = 0, since P (xn[1:T ], zn, xˆn[1:T ]) = p(xn[1:T ], zn)P (xˆn[1:T ]|xn[1:T ], zn).
Sometimes we need a special case of SW theorem for recovering only one source Xn1 from random
bins B1, · · · , BT and Zn. The following lemma gives sufficient conditions on this problem:
Lemma 2. If for each S ⊆ [2 : T ], the following constraint holds
R1 +
∑
t∈S
Rt > H(X1XS |XScZ), (7)
then there exists an appropriate decoder such that the error probability of recovering Xn1 from (Z
n, B[1:T ])
tends to zero as n→∞. Equivalently, we have
EB
∥∥∥P (xn[1:T ], zn, xˆn1 )− p(xn[1:T ], zn)1{xˆn1 = xn1}∥∥∥
1
→ 0.
4 Achievability proof through probability approximation
In this section, we illustrate the OSRB framework in details through some examples. Before going
through these examples, we state some useful lemmas on total variation of arbitrary (random) pmfs.
Definition 1. For any random pmfs PX and QX on X , we write PX ≈ QX if E ‖PX −QX‖1 < . Simi-
larly we use pX
≈ qX for two (non-random) pmfs to denote the total variation constraint ‖pX − qX‖1 < .
Definition 2. For any two sequences of random pmfs PX(n) and QX(n) on X (n) (where X (n) is arbitrary
and it differs from X n which is a cartesian product), we write PX(n) ≈ QX(n) if limn→∞ E ‖PX(n) −QX(n)‖1 =
0. Similarly we use pX(n) ≈ qX(n) for two sequences of (non-random) pmfs.
Lemma 3. We have
1. [6, Lemma 17]:
∥∥pXpY |X − qXpY |X∥∥1 = ‖pX − qX‖1
[6, Lemma 16]: ‖pX − qX‖1 ≤
∥∥pXpY |X − qXqY |X∥∥1.
2. If pXpY |X
≈ qXqY |X , then there exists x ∈ X such that pY |X=x
2≈ qY |X=x.
2′) More generally the probability of the set {x ∈ X : pY |X=x
√
≈ qY |X=x} under both pX and qX
is at least 1− 2√.
3. If PX
≈ QX and PXPY |X
δ≈ PXQY |X , then PXPY |X
+δ≈ QXQY |X .
Proof. See Appendix C.
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Lemma 3 and Definition 2 immediately imply the following variant of Lemma 3 which is used through-
out the paper.
Lemma 4. We have
1. PX(n) ≈ QX(n) ⇒ PX(n)PY (n)|X(n) ≈ QX(n)PY (n)|X(n),
PX(n)PY (n)|X(n) ≈ QX(n)QY (n)|X(n) ⇒ PX(n) ≈ QX(n).
2. If pX(n)pY (n)|X(n) ≈ qX(n)qY (n)|X(n), then there exists a sequence x(n) ∈ X (n) such that pY (n)|X(n)=x(n) ≈
qY (n)|X(n)=x(n).
3. If PX(n) ≈ QX(n) and PX(n)PY (n)|X(n) ≈ PX(n)QY (n)|X(n), then PX(n)PY (n)|X(n) ≈ QX(n)QY (n)|X(n).
Lemma 5. If d : X×Y → [0, dmax] is a bounded distortion measure, pXY is a pmf with EpXY d(X,Y ) = D
and qXY is a pmf such that qXY
≈ pXY , then we have
EqXY d(X,Y ) ≤ D + dmax. (8)
Proof. See Appendix D.
4.1 OSRB framework
In the previous section, we described the OSRB framework for the achievability proof of the channel
coding problem at an intuitive level. Here we set up a general proof structure that we will use consistently
throughout this paper. The OSRB farmework is divided into three parts.
• Part (1) of the proof: we introduce two protocols each of which induces a pmf on a certain
set of r.v.’s. To define these protocols, we assume that there exists a shared randomness
among all parties of the problem. The first protocol is related to the dual problem (or source
coding side of the problem) and does not lead to a concrete coding algorithm. However the
second protocol is suitable for construction of a code, with one exception: the second protocol
is assisted with a common randomness that does not really exist in the model.
• Part (2) of the proof: we first find constraints implying that the two induced distributions are
almost identical. In other words, the two protocols are equivalent. Thus it suffices to resort to
the source coding side of problem and investigate the desired properties such as reliability (or
vanishing error probability), secrecy, distortions, etc in the source coding side of the problem.
• Part (3) of the proof: we eliminate the shared randomness given to the second protocol without
disturbing the desired properties. To do this, we find an instance of the shared randomness
such that conditioned on it, the desired properties still hold. This makes the second protocol
useful for code construction.
4.2 Channel coding
A formal proof of the point-to-point channel coding problem is as follows:
Part (1) of the proof: Take some arbitrary p(x). We define two protocols each of which induces a
joint distribution on random variables that are defined during the protocol.
Protocol A (source coding side of the problem). Let (Xn, Y n) be i.i.d. and distributed according to
p(x, y) = p(x)p(y|x).
Random Binning: Consider the following random binning: to each sequence xn, assign uniformly
and independently two bin indices m ∈ [1 : 2nR] and f ∈ [1 : 2nR˜]. Further, we use a PSW (xˆn|yn, f)
Slepian-Wolf decoder to recover xn from (yn, f). We denote the output of the decoder by xˆn. The rate
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constraint for the success of the decoder will be discussed later, although this decoder can be conceived
even when there is no guarantee of success.
The random 3 pmf induced by the random binning, denoted by P , can be expressed as follows:
P (xn, yn,m, f, xˆn) = p(xn, yn)P (m, f |xn)PSW (xˆn|yn, f)
= P (m, f, xn)p(yn|xn)PSW (xˆn|yn, f)
= P (m, f)P (xn|m, f)p(yn|xn)PSW (xˆn|yn, f). (9)
Protocol B (main problem assisted with shared randomness). In this protocol we assume that the
transmitter and the receiver have access to the shared randomness F where F is uniformly distributed
over [1 : 2nR˜]. Then, the protocol proceeds as follows:
• The transmitter chooses a message m uniformly distributed over [1 : 2nR] and independently of F .
• In the second stage, knowing (m, f), the transmitter generates a sequence xn according to the
conditional pmf P (xn|m, f) of the protocol A. Then it sends xn over the channel.
• At the final stage, the receiver, knowing (yn, f) uses the Slepian-Wolf decoder PSW (xˆn|yn, f) of
protocol A to obtain xˆn as an estimate of xn. Then, it declares the bin index mˆ = M(xˆn) assigned
to xˆn as the estimate of the transmitted message m.
The random pmf induced by the protocol, denoted by Pˆ , factors as
Pˆ (xn, yn,m, f, xˆn) = pU (f)pU (m)P (xn|m, f)p(yn|xn)PSW (xˆn|yn, f). (10)
Part (2a) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the induced pmfs approximately the same:
To find the constraints that imply that the pmf Pˆ is close to the pmf P in total variation distance,
we start with P and make it close to Pˆ in a few steps. The first step is to observe that m and f
are the bin indices of xn in Protocol A. Theorem 1 implies that if R + R˜ < H(X) then we have
P (m, f) ≈ pU (m)pU (f) = Pˆ (m, f). Equations (9) and (10) imply
Pˆ (m, f, xn, yn, xˆn) ≈ P (m, f, xn, yn, xˆn). (11)
Part (2b) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the Slepian-Wolf decoder succeed : The next
step is to see that when the Slepian-Wolf decoder of protocol A can reliably decode the transmitted
sequence Xn. Lemma 1 requires imposing the constraint R˜ > H(X|Y ). It yields
P (m, f, xn, yn, xˆn) ≈ P (m, f, xn, yn)1{xˆn = xn}. (12)
Using equations (11), (12) and the triangle inequality, we have
Pˆ (m, f, xn, yn, xˆn) ≈ P (m, f, xn, yn)1{xˆn = xn}. (13)
Part (3) of the proof: Eliminating the shared randomness. In the protocol we assumed that the
transmitter and the receiver have access to shared randomness4 F which is not present in the model.
Nevertheless, we show that the transmitter and the receiver can agree on an instance f of F . Using
Definition 1, equation (13) guarantees the existence of a fixed binning with the corresponding pmf p
such that if we replace P with p in (10) and denote the resulting pmf with pˆ, then pˆ(m, f, xn, yn, xˆn) ≈
p(m, f, xn, yn)1{xˆn = xn}. In particular, this gives pˆ(Xˆn 6= Xn) ≤ n for some vanishing sequence n.
This guarantees the existence of a good instance F = f such that pˆ(Xn 6= Xˆn|f) ≤ n. Reliable recovery
of the transmitted Xn implies reliable recovery of the message M .
Finally, identifying p(xn|m, f) as the encoder and (pSW (xˆn|yn, f),M(xˆn)) as the decoder results in a
pair of encoder-decoder with the probability of error at most n.
3The pmf is random due to the random binning assignment in the protocol.
4It is worthy to note that the random binning map is also shared between the transmitter and the receiver. So we must
simultaneously find a good fixed binning and a good instance f . However the random binning is a usual shared randomness
and can be regarded as background randomness. In the other hand, the shared randomness F plays an essential role in our
framework and does not exist in the other works, so one can regard this kind of randomness as foreground randomness.
In the rest of the paper, we emphasize the foreground randomness while bearing in mind that random binning is the
background randomness. Also, whenever we eliminate the shared randomness, we first find a good fixed binning with some
desired properties and then remove the foreground randomness with respect to this fixed binning.
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4.3 Wiretap channel (secrecy for free)
We now turn our attention to wiretap channel, to show in details that how one can prove secrecy for
free. We use the strong secrecy in terms of vanishing total variation distance as our secrecy criterion.
First we have the following formal definition.
Problem definition: Consider the problem of secure transmission over a wiretap channel, p(y, z|x).
Here, we wish to securely transmit a message M ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ] to the receiver Y , while concealing it from
the wiretapper. We use the total variation distance as a measure for analyzing the secrecy. Formally
speaking there are,
• A message M which are mutually independent and uniformly distributed,
• A stochastic encoder penc(xn|m),
• A decoder which assigns an estimate Mˆ of M to each yn.
A rate R is said to be achievable if Pr{Mˆ 6= M} → 0 and M is nearly independent of the wiretapper
output, Zn, that is, ∥∥p(m, zn)− pUM(m)p(zn)∥∥1 → 0,
where, here p(zn) is the induced pmf on Zn and is not an i.i.d. pmf.
Here we want to prove the achievability of the rate I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) using our framework. Without
loss of generality, we can assume U = X, so we will prove the achievability of the rate I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)
for the wiretap channel. The proof follows exactly from the proof of channel coding with one exception,
here we must satisfy the secrecy criterion in addition to reliability.
We set up Protocol A and Protocol B in the same way of the ones introduced in the proof of channel
coding (using the same random binning). We only replace p(y|x) by p(y, z|x). That is, the pmf’s P in
(9) and Pˆ in (10) are replace by
P (xn, yn, zn,m, f, xˆn) = p(xn, yn, zn)P (m, f |xn)PSW (xˆn|yn, f)
= P (m, f)P (xn|m, f)p(yn, zn|xn)PSW (xˆn|yn, f). (14)
Pˆ (xn, yn, zn,m, f, xˆn) = pU (f)pU (m)P (xn|m, f)p(yn, zn|xn)PSW (xˆn|yn, f). (15)
The same argument used in the part (2a) of the proof of channel coding shows that if R˜ + R < H(X)
the source coding side of the problem (Protocol A) and the main problem (Protocol B) are equivalent,
that is Pˆ (m, f, xn, yn, zn, xˆn) ≈ P (m, f, xn, yn, zn, xˆn). The same argument used in the part (2b) of the
proof of channel coding guaranties the reliability, whenever R > H(X|Y ). That is,
Pˆ (m, f, xn, yn, zn, xˆn) ≈ P (m, f, xn, yn, zn)1{xˆn = xn}. (16)
Using part one of lemma 4, we can introduce mˆ in the above equation, because random variable Mˆ is a
function of Xˆn.
Pˆ (m, f, xn, yn, zn, xˆn, mˆ) ≈ P (m, f, xn, yn, zn)1{xˆn = xn}1{M(xˆn) = mˆ}, (17)
where M(xn) is the bin assigned to xn. Using the fact that m = M(xn) and mˆ = M(xˆn) are the outputs
of the same function, one can easily show that the marginal pmf of the RHS of (17) for the random
variables (M,F,Zn, Mˆ) factorizes as P (m, f, zn)1{mˆ = m}. Using (17) and the first part of Lemma 4,
we get
Pˆ (m, f, zn, mˆ) ≈ P (m, f, zn)1{mˆ = m}. (18)
We now add a third sub-part to the second part of the proof of channel coding which guarantees
secrecy.
Part (2c) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the protocols secure: We must take care of
independence of M , and (Zn, F ) consisting of the the wiretapper’s output and the shared randomness.
Consider the random variables of protocol A. Substituting X1 = X,Z = Z in Theorem 1 implies that
M is nearly independent of (Zn, F ) if
R+ R˜ < H(X|Z). (19)
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In other words, the above constraints imply that
P (zn, f,m) ≈ p(zn)pU (f)pU (m). (20)
Also observe that the pmf P (zn) is equal to i.i.d. pmf p(zn) in Protocol A.
Using equations (18), (20) and the third part of Lemma 4 we have
Pˆ (m, f, zn, mˆ) ≈ p(zn)pU (f)pU (m)1{mˆ = m}. (21)
Part (3) of the proof: Eliminating the shared randomness: In the protocol we assumed that the
transmitter, the receivers and the wiretapper have access to shared randomness F which is not present
in the model. Nevertheless, we show that the transmitter and the receivers can agree on an instance f
of F . Using Definition 1, equation (21) guarantees existence of a fixed binning with the corresponding
pmf p such that if we replace P with p in (15) and denote the resulting pmf with pˆ, then
pˆ(m, f, zn, mˆ) ≈ p(zn)pU (f)pU (m)1{mˆ = m}.
Now, the second part of Lemma 4 shows that there exists an instance f such that
pˆ(m, zn, mˆ|f) ≈ p(zn)pU (m)1{mˆ = m}.
This approximation yields both the secrecy and the reliability requirements as follows:
• Reliability: Using the second item in part 1 of Lemma 4 we conclude that
pˆ(m, mˆ|f) ≈ pU (m)1{mˆ = m},
which is equivalent to pˆ
(
Mˆ 6= M |f
)
→ 0.
• Secrecy: Using the second item in part 1 of Lemma 4 we conclude that pˆ(zn,m|f) ≈ pU (m)p(zn).
Finally, identifying p(xn|m, f) as the encoder and the Slepian-Wolf decoder results in reliable and secure
encoder-decoder.
4.4 Lossy source coding
Problem definition: Consider the problem of lossy compression of a source within a desired distortion. In
this setting, there is an i.i.d. sourceXn distributed according to p(x), an (stochastic) encoder mapping X n
to M ∈ [1 : 2nR], a decoder that reconstructs a lossy version of Xn (namely Y n) and a distortion measure
d : X × Y → [0, dmax]. A rate R is said to be achievable at the distortion D, if E(d(Xn, Y n)) ≤ D + n,
where n → 0 and d(Xn, Y n) is the average per letter distortion.
Statement: Here we wish to reprove the known result on the achievability of the rate R > I(X;Y )
for any p(x, y) where Ed(X,Y ) < D.
Proof: An overview of the proof is given in Fig. 4. Take some arbitrary p(x, y) where Ed(X,Y ) < D.
Part (1) of the proof: We define two protocols each of which induces a joint distribution on random
variables that are defined during the protocol. Fig. 4 illustrates how the source coding side of problem
can be used to prove the main problem. Protocol A (Source coding side of the problem). Let (Xn, Y n)
be i.i.d. and distributed according to p(x, y).
Random Binning: Consider the following random binning: to each sequence yn, assign uniformly and
independently two bin indices m ∈ [1 : 2nR] and f ∈ [1 : 2nR˜]. Further, we use a Slepian-Wolf decoder to
recover yn from (m, f). We denote the output of the decoder by yˆn. The rate constraint for the success
of the decoder will be discussed later, although this decoder can be conceived even when there is no
guarantee of success.
The random pmf induced by the random binning, denoted by P , can be expressed as follows:
P (xn, yn,m, f, yˆn) = p(xn, yn)P (f |yn)P (m|yn)PSW (yˆn|m, f)
= P (f, xn, yn)P (m|yn)PSW (yˆn|m, f)
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Figure 4: (Top) Source coding side of the problem (Protocol A). We pass i.i.d. source Xn through a virtual DMC
pY |X to get an i.i.d. sequence Y n with the desired distortion less than D. This is because Ep(xn,yn)d(Xn, Y n) =
Ed(X,Y ) < D. So we aim to describe the good sequence Y n to decoder. We describe Y n through two random
bins M and F at rates R and R˜, where M will serve as the message for the receiver in the main problem, while F
will serve as the shared randomness. We use SW decoder for decoding. As long as R + R˜ > H(Y ), decoder can
reliably decode the good sequence Y n with the desired distortion. (Bottom) Coding for the lossy source coding
problem assisted with the shared randomness (Protocol B). We pass the source Xn and the shared randomness
F through the reverse encoder to get a sequence Y n. If the joint distribution of Xn and F is equal to that of
protocol A, then the two protocols are equivalent, meaning that Y n is a sequence with the desired distortion. Since
E[d(Xn, Y n)] = EFE[d(Xn, Y n)|F ] < D, the parties can find a good instance F = f of shared randomness without
disturbing the distortion criterion, i.e. E[d(Xn, Y n)|F = f ] < D. However conditioned on f , the distribution of
the source can be disturbed (it is not equal to pXn). To get rid of this bad effect, we assume that the shared
randomness and the source are nearly independent. So to get the equivalence between the two protocols, we need
to impose constraint implying PXn,F ≈ pXnpUF . This is holds as long as R˜ < H(Y |X).
= P (f, xn)P (yn|xn, f)P (m|yn)PSW (yˆn|m, f). (22)
The relation among random variables and random bin assignments is depicted in the top diagram of Fig.
4.
Protocol B (coding for the main problem assisted with the shared randomness). In this protocol
we assume that the transmitter and the receiver have access to the shared randomness F where F is
uniformly distributed over [1 : 2nR˜]. Then, the protocol proceeds as follows (see also the bottom diagram
of Fig. 4 demonstrating the protocol B):
• The transmitter generates Y n according to the conditional pmf P (yn|xn, f) of protocol A.
• Next, knowing yn, the transmitter sends m which is the bin index of yn. Random variable M is
generated according to the conditional pmf P (m|yn) of protocol A.
• At the final stage, the receiver, knowing (m, f) uses the Slepian-Wolf decoder PSW (yˆn|m, f) of
protocol A to obtain an estimate of yn.
The random pmf induced by the protocol, denoted by Pˆ , factors as
Pˆ (xn, yn,m, f, yˆn) = pU (f)p(xn)P (yn|xn, f)P (m|yn)PSW (yˆn|m, f) (23)
Part (2a) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the induced pmfs approximately the same: To
find the constraints that imply that the pmf Pˆ is close to the pmf P in total variation distance, we start
with P and make it close to Pˆ in a few steps. The first step is to observe that f is a bin index of yn in
protocol A. Theorem 1 implies that if R˜ < H(Y |X) then P (f, xn) ≈ pU (f)p(xn) = Pˆ (f, xn). Equations
(22) and (23) imply
Pˆ (m, f, xn, yn, yˆn) ≈ P (m, f, xn, yn, yˆn) (24)
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Part (2b) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the Slepian-Wolf decoder succeed : The next
step is to see that when the Slepian-Wolf decoder of protocol A can reliably decode the sequence Y n.
Lemma 1 requires imposing the constraint R+ R˜ > H(Y ). It yields that
P (m, f, xn, yn, yˆn) ≈ P (m, f, xn, yn)1{yˆn = yn}. (25)
Using equations (24), (25) and the triangle inequality 4 we have
Pˆ (m, f, xn, yn, yˆn) ≈ P (m, f, xn, yn)1{yˆn = yn}. (26)
Part (3) of the proof: Eliminating the shared randomness F : Using Definition 1, equation (26)
guarantees existence of a fixed binning with the corresponding pmf p such that if we replace P with
p in (23) and denote the resulting pmf with pˆ, then pˆ(m, f, xn, yn, yˆn) ≈ p(m, f, xn, yn)1{yˆn = yn} :=
p˜(m, f, xn, yn, yˆn). Using the second item of part one of Lemma 4, we have pˆ(xn, yˆn) ≈ p˜(xn, yˆn) =
pXnY n(x
n, yˆn).
Applying lemma 5 to p˜XnYˆ n and pˆXnY n and noting that EpXnY n (xn,yˆn)d(X
n, Yˆ n) < D, we obtain
Epˆ(xn,yˆn)d(Xn, Yˆ n) < D,
for sufficiently large n. Using the law of iterated expectation, we conclude that there exists an F = f
such that Epˆ(xn,yˆn|f)d(Xn, Yˆ n) < D.
Finally, specifying p(m|xn, f) as the encoder (which is equivalent to generating a random sequence
yn according to p(yn|xn, f) and then transmitting the bin index m assigned to yn) and pSW (yˆn|m, f) as
the decoder results in a pair of encoder-decoder obeying the desired distortion.
4.5 Distributed channel synthesis
One important application of our framework is to prove achievability part of the channel simulation
problems, see [35, 36, 37]. In this subsection, we illustrate how our achievability framework can be
adopted to prove the achievability part of channel simulation problems over networks. To do this, we
apply our framework to re-prove the achievability part of the channel synthesis problem [7] as a building
block of channel simulation problems. First we give a formal definition of the problem.
Channel synthesis problem: In this setting, there are a stochastic encoder, a stochastic decoder, a
communication link of limited rate R1 between encoder and decoder, an i.i.d. source X
n distributed
according to pX and a common randomness ω uniformly distributed over a finite set [1 : 2
nR0 ] that is
independent of the source. Observing the source and the common randomness, the encoder chooses an
index M ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ] and transmits it over the communication link to the decoder. Observing M and the
common randomness ω, the decoder produces an output Y n. The goal is to find an encoder-decoder such
that the induced distribution on (Xn, Y n) could not be distinguished from a given joint i.i.d. distribution
according to pXY = pXpY |X , which can be thought of as the joint distribution of (Xn, Y n) when Xn
is transmitted over a DMC channel pY |X . A rate pair (R0, R1) is said to be achievable, if there exists
a sequence of encoder-decoders such that the total variation distance between the induced distribution
p(ind)(xn, yn) and the i.i.d. distribution p(xn, yn) vanishes as n goes to infinity, that is
lim
n→∞
∥∥∥∥∥p(ind)(xn, yn)−
n∏
i=1
p(x1,i, y1,i)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
= 0. (27)
Theorem 2 ([7, Theorem II.1]). A rate pair (R0, R1) is achievable iff there exists a random variable
U such that X − U − Y is a Markov chain, the marginal distribution of (X,Y ) is equal to the desired
distribution pXY and the following inequalities hold:
R1 > I(X;U),
R0 +R1 > I(XY ;U).
(28)
Proof. Part (1) of proof : We define two protocols each of which induces a joint distribution on random
variables that are defined during the protocol. Fig. 5 illustrates how the source coding side of problem
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Figure 5: (Left) Source coding side of the problem (Protocol A). We pass the i.i.d. source Xn through a virtual
DMC pU |X to get an i.i.d. sequence Un and then we pass Un a virtual DMC pY |U to get an i.i.d. sequence Y n. The
sequences Xn, Un and Y n are jointly i.i.d. and distributed according to p(x, u, y) = p(x, u)p(y|u). In particular,
(Xn, Y n) have the desired i.i.d. distribution p(xn, yn). To produce Y n, decoder only needs to access to Un, so we
aim to describe the sequence Un to the decoder. We describe Un through three random bins M , ω and F , where
M will serve as the message from the encoder to the decoder in the main problem, while ω and F will serve as
the common randomness and the extra shared randomness. We use SW decoder for decoding. As long as the SW
constraint (33) is satisfied, decoder can reliably decode the sequence Un and then produces Y n using the virtual
DMC pY |U . (Right) Coding for the channel synthesis problem assisted with the extra shared randomness (Protocol
B). We pass the source Xn, the common randomness ω and the extra shared randomness F through the reverse
encoder to get a sequence Un. Similar to the lossy source coding problem, one needs to have mutual independence
among the source, the common randomness and the shared randomnesses. This is because the source and the
common randomness are independent by the problem definition and at the last step of proof, we must eliminate
the shared randomness by conditioning on an instance of it, without disturbing the joint distribution of the source
and common randomness. To get the equivalence between the two protocols, we need to impose a constraint
implying the desired mutual independence. This holds as long as (31) is satisfied. Finally we must eliminate the
shared randomness F by conditioning on an instance of the shared randomness, without disturbing the desired
joint i.i.d. distribution of (Xn, Y n). To do this, it suffices to have F⊥(Xn, Y n). Resorting to the source coding
side, we observe F⊥(Xn, Y n) holds whenever (37) is satisfied.
can be used to prove the main problem.
Protocol A. Let (Xn, Un, Y n) i.i.d. and distributed according to p(x, u, y) given in the Theorem 2.
Consider the following random binning:
• To each un, assign three random bin indices F ∈ [1 : 2nR˜], m ∈ [1 : 2nR] and ω ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ].
• We use Slepian-Wolf decoder to estimate uˆn from (ω, f,m).
The rate constraints for the success of these decoders will be imposed later, although these decoders
can be conceived even when there is no guarantee of success. The random pmf induced by the random
binning, denoted by P , can be expressed as follows:
P (xn, un, yn, f,m, ω, uˆn) = p(xnun)p(yn|un)P (f,m, ω|un)PSW (uˆn|f,m, ω)
= p(xn)P (un, f,m, ω|xn)p(yn|un)PSW (uˆn|f,m, ω)
= P (xn, f, ω)P (un|f, ω, xn)P (m|un)PSW (uˆn|f,m, ω)p(yn|un) (29)
The relation among random variables and random bin assignments is depicted in the left diagram of Fig.
5.
Protocol B. In this protocol we assume that the nodes have access to the extra common randomness
F where F is distributed uniformly over the sets [1 : 2nR˜]. Now we use the following protocol (see also
the right diagram of Fig. 5 demonstrating the protocol B):
• At the first stage, encoder knowing (f, ω, xn) generate a sequence un according to the pmf P (un|f, ω, xn),
and sends the bin index of m(un) of protocol A to the decoder.
• In the second stage, knowing (f, ω,m), decoder uses the Slepian-Wolf decoder PSW (uˆn|f,m, ω) to
obtain an estimate of un. Then it generates yn according to p(yn|uˆn) (more precisely, pY n|Un(yn|uˆn)).
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The random pmf induced by the protocol, denoted by Pˆ , can be written as follows:
Pˆ (xn, un, yn, f,m, ω, uˆn) = p(xn)pU (f)pU (ω)P (un|f, ω, xn)P (m|un)PSW (uˆn|f,m, ω)p(yn|uˆn). (30)
Part 2 of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the induced pmfs approximately the same: To
find the constraints that imply that the pmf Pˆ is close to the pmf P in total variation distance, we start
with P and make it close to Pˆ in a few steps. The first step is to observe that (f, ω) is the bin index of
un. Theorem 1 implies that if
R0 + R˜ < H(U |X), (31)
then P (xn, f, ω) ≈ p(xn)pU (f)pU (ω) = Pˆ (xn, f, ω). This implies
P (xn, un, f,m, ω, uˆn) ≈ Pˆ (xn, un, f,m, ω, uˆn). (32)
The next step is to see that when the Slepian-Wolf decoder of protocol A can reliably decode the
sequence Un. Lemma 1 requires imposing the following constraint:
R˜+R0 +R1 > H(U). (33)
It yields that
P (xn, un, f,m, ω, uˆn) ≈ P (xn, un, f,m, ω)1{uˆn = un}. (34)
This besides (32) and the first part and the third part of Lemma 4 give
Pˆ (xn, un, yn, f,m, ω, uˆn) = Pˆ (xn, un, f,m, ω, uˆn)p(yn|uˆn)
≈ P (xn, un, f,m, ω)1{uˆn = un}p(yn|uˆn)
= P (xn, un, f,m, ω)1{uˆn = un}p(yn|un)
= P (xn, un, yn, f,m, ω)1{uˆn = un}. (35)
Using the first of Lemma 4 we conclude that
Pˆ (f, xn, yn) ≈ P (f, xn, yn). (36)
In particular, the marginal pmf of (Xn, Y n) of the RHS of this expression is equal to p(xn, yn) which is
the desired pmf.
Part(3) of proof: In the protocol we assumed that the nodes have access to an external randomness
F which is not present in the model. Nevertheless, we can assume that the nodes agree on an instance
f of F . In this case, the induced pmf Pˆ (xn, yn) changes to the conditional pmf Pˆ (xn, yn|f). But if F is
independent of (Xn, Y n), then the conditional pmf Pˆ (xn, yn|f) is also close to the desired distribution.
To obtain the independence, we again use Theorem 1. Substituting T = 1, X1 = U and Z = XY in
Theorem 1, asserts that if
R˜ < H(U |XY ), (37)
then P (xn, yn, f) ≈ pU (f)p(xn, yn) implying Pˆ (xn, yn, f) ≈ pU (f)p(xn, yn). Thus, there exists a fixed
binning with the corresponding pmf p˜ such that if we replace P with p˜ in (30) and denote the resulting
pmf with pˆ, then pˆ(xn, yn, f) ≈ pU (f)p(xn, yn). Now the second part of Lemma 4 shows that there exists
an instance F such that pˆ(xn, yn|f) ≈ p(xn, yn).
Specifying p(m|xn, f, ω) as the encoder (which is equivalent to generating a random sequence un
according to p(un|xn, f, ω) and then transmitting the bin index m assigned to un) and (pSW (uˆn|m, f, ω)
as the decoder results in a pair of encoder-decoder obeying the desired vanishing total variation distance.
Finally, eliminating R˜1 from (31), (33) and (37) using Fourier-Motzkin elimination (FME) results in the
rate region (28).
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Remark 4. We have applied FME to the constraint (31), (33) and (37). However we have the implicit
constraint R˜ ≥ 0. Nevertheless, we show that this constraint is redundant. To do this, we show that if
(R0, R1, R˜) satisfies (31), (33) and (37) for some r.v. U and R˜ (which is not necessarily positive), then
there exists a r.v. U¯ and R¯ ≥ 0 such that (R0, R1, R¯) satisfies (31), (33) and (37) for U¯ instead of U . If
R˜ ≥ 0, it is nothing to prove. So we assume R˜ < 0. Let W be a r.v. with entropy H(W ) > |R˜|. Further
assume that W is independent of all other r.v.’s, i.e. (U,X, Y ). Let R¯ = R˜+H(W ) and U¯ = (U,W ). It
is clear that R¯ > 0. Now it can easily shown that (R0, R1, R¯) satisfies (31), (33) and (37) for U¯ , using
the independence of W from all other r.v.’s and the fact that (R0, R1, R˜) satisfies (31), (33) and (37).
4.6 Wiretap broadcast channels with strong secrecy criterion
Problem definition: Consider the problem of secure transmission over a broadcast channel with a wire-
tapper, p(y1, y2, z|x). Here, we wish to securely transmit a common message m0 ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ] to the
receivers Y1, Y2 and two private messages mj ∈ [1 : 2nRj ], j = 1, 2 to the receivers Yj , j = 1, 2, respec-
tively, while concealing them from the wiretapper. We use the total variation distance as a measure for
analyzing the secrecy. Formally speaking there are,
• Three messages M0,M1,M2 which are mutually independent and uniformly distributed,
• A stochastic encoder penc(xn|m[0:2]),
• Two decoders, where decoder j assigns an estimate (mˆ0,j , mˆj) of (m0,mj) to each ynj .
A rate-tuple (R0, R1, R2) is said to be achievable if Pr{∪j=1,2(Mˆ0,j , Mˆj) 6= (M0,Mj)} → 0 and M[0:2]
is nearly independent of the wiretapper output, Zn, that is,∥∥∥p(m[0:2], zn)− pUM[0:2](m[0:2])p(zn)∥∥∥1 → 0,
where, here p(zn) is the induced pmf on Zn and is not an i.i.d. pmf.
Below, we state an extension of Marton’s inner bound for the capacity region of wiretap broadcast
channel.
Theorem 3. A rate-tuple (R0, R1, R2) is achievable for the secure transmission over the wiretap broad-
cast channel, if it belongs to the convex hull of
R0 +Rj < I(U0Uj ;Yj |Q)− I(U0Uj ;Z|Q), j = 1, 2.
R0 +R1 +R2 < min {I(U0;Y1|Q), I(U0;Y2|Q)}+ I(U1;Y1|U0, Q)
+ I(U2;Y2|U0, Q)− I(U1;U2|U0, Q)− I(U[0:2];Z|Q)
2R0 +R1 +R2 < I(U0U1;Y1|Q)− I(U0U1;Z|Q) + I(U0U2;Y2|Q)
− I(U0U2;Z|Q)− I(U1;U2|U0, Z,Q) (38)
where Q,U[0:2] −X − (Y1, Y2, Z) forms a Markov chain.
Proof. For simplicity we consider the case where the time-sharing r.v. Q is a constant random variable.
One can incorporate this into our proof by generating its i.i.d. copies, and sharing it among all parties
and conditioning everything on it.
Take some arbitrary p(u[0:2], x)p(y1, y2, z|x).
Part (1) of the proof: We define two protocols each of which induces a joint distribution on random
variables that are defined during the protocol.
Protocol A. Let (Un[0:2], X
n, Y n1 , Y
n
2 , Z
n) be i.i.d. and distributed according to p(u[0:2], x, y1, y2, z).
Fig. 6 illustrates how the source coding side of problem can be used to prove the main problem, for the
case of original broadcast channel without common message.
Random Binning: Consider the following random binning:
• To each un0 assign uniformly and independently two random bin indices m0 ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ] and
f0 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜0 ],
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Figure 6: (Left) Source coding side of the broadcast channel (Protocol A). Here (Un1 , U
n
2 ) are jointly i.i.d. and
distributed according to pU1U2 . Then (U
n
1 , U
n
2 ) pass through the virtual DMC pY1Y2|U1U2 (which is the channel
resulted from concatenating two DMC’s pX|U[1:2] and pY1Y2|X). Thus (U
n
[1:2], Y
n
[1:2]) are jointly i.i.d. We take the
message Mj as a bin index of U
n
j . Hence to transmit the message Mj to the decoder j, it suffices to describe U
n
j for
the decoder j. We describe Unj through a random bin Fj of rate R˜j . F1, F2 will serve as the shared randomness.
Using SW decoder, we observe that as long as the SW constraints R˜j > H(Uj |Yj), j = 1, 2 hold, decoder j can
reliably decode Unj and thus the message Mj . (Right) Coding for the broadcast channel assisted with the shared
randomness (Protocol B). Encoder passes the source M[1:2] and the shared randomness F[1:2] through the reverse
encoder to get sequences Un1 and U
n
2 . Similar to the channel coding problem, one needs to have independence
among the shared randomnesses and the messages. This is because at the last step of proof, we must eliminate the
shared randomness by conditioning on an instance of it, without disturbing the uniformity of the messages and
the independence between them. To get the equivalence between the two protocols, we need to impose constraints
implying M1⊥M2⊥F[1:2]. This is holds if Rj + R˜j < H(Uj), j = 1, 2 and R1 + R2 + R˜1 + R˜2 < H(U[1:2]). The
SW constraints and these constraints give the Marton’s inner bound without common message. Adding secrecy is
free, one needs only to replace the entropies in these constraints with the conditional entropies H(U1|Z), H(U2|Z)
and H(U[1:2]|Z) which implies the mutual independence among M1,M2, F1, F2 and Zn, where Zn is the channel
output at the eavesdropper.
• For j = 1, 2, to each pair (un0 , unj ) assign uniformly and independently two random bin indices
mj ∈ [1 : 2nRj ] and fj ∈ [1 : 2nR˜j ].
• We use a Slepian-Wolf decoder to recover (uˆn0,1, uˆn1 ) from (yn1 , f0, f1), and another Slepian-Wolf
decoder to recover uˆn0,2, uˆ
n
2 from (y
n
2 , f0, f2). Note that we denote the two estimates of u
n
0 by
the two receivers with uˆn0,1 and uˆ
n
0,2. The rate constraints for the success of these decoders will
be imposed later, although these decoders can be conceived even when there is no guarantee of
success.
• Upon obtaining the pair (uˆn0,j , uˆnj ), decoder j = 1, 2 declares the bin indices mˆ0,j = M0(uˆn0,j) and
mˆj = Mj(uˆ
n
0,j , uˆ
n
j ) (assigned to uˆ
n
0,j and (uˆ
n
0,j , uˆ
n
j ), respectively) as the estimate of the pair (m0,mj).
The random pmf induced by the random binning, denoted by P , can be expressed as follows:
P (un[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n,m[0:2], f[0:2], uˆ
n
0,1, uˆ
n
1 , uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 ) = p(u
n
[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n)P (f[0:2]|un[0:2])P (m[0:2]|un[0:2])
× PSW (uˆn0,1, uˆn1 |yn1 , f0, f1)PSW (uˆn0,2, uˆn2 |yn2 , f0, f2)
= P (f[0:2],m[0:2], u
n
[0:2])p(x
n|un[0:2])p(yn1 , yn2 , zn|xn)
× PSW (uˆn0,1, uˆn1 |yn1 , f0, f1)PSW (uˆn0,2, uˆn2 |yn2 , f0, f2)
= P (f[0:2],m[0:2])P (u
n
[0:2]|f[0:2],m[0:2])p(xn|un[0:2])p(yn1 , yn2 , zn|xn)
× PSW (uˆn0,1, uˆn1 |yn1 , f0, f1)PSW (uˆn0,2, uˆn2 |yn2 , f0, f2).
(39)
We have ignored Mˆ -r.v.s from the pmf at this stage since they are functions of other random variables.
The relation among random variables and random bin assignments for the broadcast channel are depicted
in the left diagram of Fig. 6, where for simplicity we assume U0 is a constant random variable.
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Protocol B. In this protocol we assume that the transmitter, the two receivers and the wiretapper
have access to the shared randomness F[0:2] where F[0:2] is uniformly distributed over [1 : 2
nR˜0 ] × [1 :
2nR˜1 ] × [1 : 2nR˜2 ]. Observe that this implies that F0, F1 and F2 are mutually independent. Then, the
protocol proceeds as follows (see also the right diagram of Fig. 6 demonstrating the protocol B):
• The messages M0, M1 and M2 are mutually independent of each other and of F[0:2], uniformly
distributed over [1 : 2nR0 ]× [1 : 2nR1 ]× [1 : 2nR2 ].
• The transmitter generates Un[0:2] according to the conditional pmf P (un[0:2]|m[0:2], f[0:2]) of protocol
A.
• Next, Xn is generated according to the n i.i.d. copies of the conditional pmf p(x|u[0:2]) (computed
from the arbitrary p(x, u[0:2]) we chose at the beginning). R.v. X
n is transmitted over the broadcast
channel.
• At the final stage, the receiver j = 1, 2, knowing (ynj , f0, fj) uses the Slepian-Wolf decoder
PSW (uˆn0,j , uˆ
n
j |ynj , f0, fj) of protocol A to obtain estimates of un0 and unj . We note that while the
receiver j = 1, 2 knows f0, f1 and f2, it uses only f0, fj in its Slepian-Wolf decoder.
• We use the output of the SW decoder j = 1, 2 for decoding of the messages (M0,Mj) in the same
way of the last step of Protocol A.
The random pmf induced by the protocol, denoted by Pˆ , factors as
Pˆ (un[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n,m[0:2], f[0:2],uˆ
n
0,1, uˆ
n
1 , uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 ) = p
U (f[0:2])p
U (m[0:2])P (u
n
[0:2]|m[0:2], f[0:2])p(xn|un[0:2])
p(yn[1:2], z
n|xn)PSW (uˆn0,1, uˆn1 |yn1 , f0, f1)PSW (uˆn0,2, uˆn2 |yn2 , f0, f2). (40)
We have ignored Mˆ -r.v.s from the pmf at this stage since they are (random) functions of other random
variables.
Part (2a) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the induced pmfs approximately the same: To
find the constraints that imply that the pmf Pˆ is close to the pmf P in total variation distance, we start
with P and make it close to Pˆ in a few steps. The first step is to observe that in protocol A, (m0, f0) is
a bin index of un0 , (m1, f1) is a bin index of (u
n
0 , u
n
1 ) and (m2, f2) is a bin index of (u
n
0 , u
n
2 ). Substituting
X1 = U0, X2 = U0U1, X3 = U0U2, Z = constant in Theorem 1 implies that M[0:2] is nearly independent
of F[0:2] if
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R0 + R˜0 < H(U0),
R0 +Rj + R˜0 + R˜j < H(U0Uj) , j = 1, 2,
R0 +R1 +R2 + R˜0 + R˜1 + R˜2 < H(U[0:2]). (41)
In other words, the above constraints yields P (f[0:2],m[0:2]) ≈ pU (f[0:2])pU (m[0:2]) = Pˆ (f[0:2],m[0:2]).
Equations (39) and (40) imply
Pˆ (un[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n,m[0:2], f[0:2], uˆ
n
0,1, uˆ
n
1 , uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 ) ≈ P (un[0:2], yn1 , yn2 , zn,m[0:2], f[0:2], uˆn0,1, uˆn1 , uˆn0,2, uˆn2 ).
(42)
Part (2b) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the Slepian-Wolf decoder succeed : The next
step is to see that when the Slepian-Wolf decoder j, j = 1, 2 of protocol A can reliably decode the pair
(Un0 , U
n
j ). Lemma 1 for X1 = U0, X2 = U0Uj , Z = Yj yields that the decoding of U
n
0 U
n
j is reliable if,
R˜0 + R˜j > H(U0Uj |Yj),
R˜j > H(Uj |U0Yj) for j = 1, 2. (43)
5Theorem 1 gives seven inequalities. However it can be easily seen that the inequalities associated to the subsets of
{2, 3} are redundant and implied by others. For example, the inequality associated to the subset {2} is R˜1+R1 < H(U0U1),
which is weaker than the second inequality in (41).
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It yields
P (un[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n,m[0:2], f[0:2], uˆ
n
0,1, uˆ
n
1 , uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 ) ≈ P (un[0:2], yn1 , yn2 , zn,m[0:2], f[0:2])
× 1{uˆn0,1 = uˆn0,2 = un0 , uˆn1 = un1 , uˆn2 = un2}. (44)
Using equations (42), (44) and the triangle inequality we have
Pˆ (un[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , z
n,m[0:2], f[0:2], uˆ
n
0,1, uˆ
n
1 , uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 ) ≈ P (un[0:2], yn1 , yn2 , zn,m[0:2], f[0:2])
× 1{uˆn0,1 = uˆn0,2 = un0 , uˆn1 = un1 , uˆn2 = un2}. (45)
Using the first part of Lemma 4 we have
Pˆ (un[0:2], z
n,m[0:2], f[0:2], uˆ
n
0,1, uˆ
n
1 , uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 ) ≈ P (un[0:2], zn,m[0:2], f[0:2])
× 1{uˆn0,1 = uˆn0,2 = un0 , uˆn1 = un1 , uˆn2 = un2}. (46)
Using part one of lemma 4, we can introduce (mˆ0,1, mˆ0,2, mˆ1, mˆ2) in the above equation, because these
random variables are functions of other random variables.
Pˆ (m[0:2], f[0:2], u
n
[0:2], z
n, uˆn0,1, uˆ
n
1 ,uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 , mˆ0,1, mˆ1, mˆ0,2, mˆ) ≈ P (m[0:2], f[0:2], un[0:2], zn)
× 1{uˆn0,1 = uˆn0,2 = un0 , uˆn1 = un1 , uˆn2 = un2}
× 1{M0(uˆn0,1) = mˆ0,1,M0(uˆn0,2) = mˆ0,2,M1(uˆn0,1, uˆn1 ) = mˆ1,M2(uˆn0,2, uˆn2 ) = mˆ2},
= P (m[0:2], f[0:2], u
n
[0:2], z
n)1{uˆn0,1 = uˆn0,2 = un0 , uˆn1 = un1 , uˆn2 = un2}
× 1{mˆ0,1 = mˆ0,2 = m0, mˆ1 = m1, mˆ2 = m2}, (47)
where we use M0(u
n
0 ), M1(u
n
0 , u
n
1 ) and M2(u
n
0 , u
n
2 ) to denote the bins assigned to u
n
0 , (u
n
0 , u
n
1 ) and (u
n
0 , u
n
2 ),
respectively. It can can be easily seen that the marginal pmf of the RHS of (47) for the random variables
(M[0:2], F[0:2], Z
n, Mˆ0,1, Mˆ0,2, Mˆ1, Mˆ2) factorizes as P (m[0:2], f[0:2], z
n)1{mˆ0,1 = mˆ0,2 = m0, mˆ1 = m1, mˆ2 =
m2}. Using (47) and the first part of Lemma 4, we get
Pˆ (m[0:2], f[0:2], z
n, mˆ0,1, mˆ1, mˆ0,2, mˆ2) ≈ P (m[0:2], f[0:2], zn)1{mˆ0,1 = mˆ0,2 = m0, mˆ1 = m1, mˆ2 = m2}.
(48)
Before we consider the secrecy part of problem, we assume that there is no eavesdropper, i.e. Z =
constant. So we deal with the broadcast channel. It can be easily seen that the constraints (41) and
(43) imply Marton’s inner bound for the broadcast channel. In the sequel, we show how one can find
the extension of Marton’s inner bound for wiretap broadcast channel, for free!
Part (2c) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the protocols secure: We must take care
of independence of M[0:2], and (Z
n, F[0:2]) consisting of the the wiretapper’s output and the shared
randomness. Consider the random variables of protocol A. Substituting X1 = U0, X2 = U0U1, X3 =
U0U2, Z = Z in Theorem 1 implies that M[0:2] is nearly independent of (Z
n, F[0:2]) if
R0 + R˜0 < H(U0|Z),
R0 +Rj + R˜0 + R˜j < H(U0Uj |Z) , j = 1, 2,
R0 +R1 +R2 + R˜0 + R˜1 + R˜2 < H(U[0:2]|Z). (49)
In other words, the above constraints imply that
P (zn, f[0:2],m[0:2]) ≈ p(zn)pU (f[0:2])pU (m[0:2]). (50)
Observe that the pmf P (zn) is equal to i.i.d. pmf p(zn) in Protocol A. Also observe that (49) is the
same as (41) with one exception, we have conditioned all entropies on the Z due to secrecy requirement.
Thus we get secrecy for free.
Using equations (48) and (50) and the third part of Lemma 4 we have
Pˆ (m[0:2], f[0:2], z
n, mˆ0,1, mˆ1, mˆ0,2, mˆ2) ≈ p(zn)pU (f[0:2])pU (m[0:2])1{mˆ0,1 = mˆ0,2 = m0, mˆ1 = m1, mˆ2 = m2}.
(51)
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Part (3) of the proof: Eliminating the shared randomness F[0:2] without disturbing the secrecy and
reliability requirements: Using Definition 1, equation (51) guarantees existence of a fixed binning with
the corresponding pmf p such that if we replace P with p in (40) and denote the resulting pmf with pˆ,
then
pˆ(m[0:2], f[0:2], z
n, mˆ0,1, mˆ1, mˆ0,2, mˆ2) ≈ p(zn)pU (f[0:2])pU (m[0:2])1{mˆ0,1 = mˆ0,2 = m0, mˆ1 = m1, mˆ2 = m2}.
Now, the second part of Lemma 4 shows that there exists an instance f[0:2] such that
pˆ(m[0:2], z
n, mˆ0,1, mˆ1, mˆ0,2, mˆ2|f[0:2]) ≈ p(zn)pU (m[0:2])1{mˆ0,1 = mˆ0,2 = m0, mˆ1 = m1, mˆ2 = m2}.
This approximation yields both the secrecy and the reliability requirements as follows:
• Reliability: Using the second item in part 1 of Lemma 4 we conclude that
pˆ(m0,mj , mˆ0,j , mˆj |f[0:2]) ≈ 1{mˆ0,j = m0, mˆj = mj},
which is equivalent to pˆ
(
(Mˆ0,jMˆj) 6= (M0,Mj)|f[0:2]
)
→ 0.
• Secrecy: Using the second item in part 1 of Lemma 4 we conclude that pˆ(zn,m[0:2]|f[0:2]) ≈
pU (m[0:2])p(z
n).
Finally, identifying p(xn|m[0:2], f[0:2]) (which is done via generating u[0:2] first) as the encoder and the
Slepian-Wolf decoders results in reliable and secure encoder-decoders.
Applying FME on (41), (43) and (49) gives (38). Note that the equations of (41) are completely
redundant.
Remark 5. Although in the OSRB-based proof of Theorem 3, we did not deal with codebook explicitly but
one can find similarity between it and codebook generation for superposition coding and Marton coding
as follows.
• (Superposition) To focus on superposition coding, let U2 be a constant random variable. Inspecting
the proof, it is seen that we used a binning for Un0 and a joint binning for (U
n
0 , U
n
1 ). Observe
that conditioned on an instance (F0, F1) = (f0, f1) of the shared randomness, the inputs of encoder
are restricted to those sequence assigned to (f0, f1). Thus one can interpret these sequences as
codewords of a codebook (although the encoder is not deterministic and there is not a one-to-
one map between the messages and the codewords.). Conditioned on f0, we get a codebook C0 of
sequences un0 assigned to f0. Also conditioned on (f0, f1), for each u
n
0 ∈ C0 we get a codebook C1(un0 )
of sequences un1 which together with u
n
0 are jointly assigned to f1. This resembles the superposition
codebook generation which uses an inner codebook C0 and a set of outer (superimposed) codebook
for each sequence of the inner codebook.
• (Marton) To focus on Marton coding without common message, let U0 be a constant random vari-
able. Inspecting the proof, it is seen that we used separate random bin assignments for Un1 and
Un2 . Again observe that conditioned on an instance (F1, F2) = (f1, f2) of the shared randomness,
the inputs of encoder are restricted to those sequence assigned to (f1, f2). Thus one can interpret
these sequences as codewords of a codebook. Conditioned on fj , j = 1, 2, we get a codebook Cj of
sequences unj assigned to fj. We note that contrary to the case of superposition, the codebooks C2
is not related to C1. This resembles the independent codebook generation of Marton coding.
In general, whenever we require superposition coding, we use binning for nested random variables while
whenever we require independent codebook generation, we use separate binning.
Remark 6. If one only wants to securely transmit a common message M0 as in [27] (i.e. R1 = R2 = 0),
the second inequality of the (43) can be neglected, because it is sufficient to recover M0 through only U
n
0 ; it
is not necessary to make sure that we do not make any error in decoding Un1 and U
n
2 (the efficacy of using
U1 and U2 without decoding them has been clarified in [27]). This resembles the idea of indirect decoding
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of Nair and El Gamal [29]. Applying FME gives the following lower bound on R0 which subsumes the
lower bound given in [27] under weak secrecy criterion:
R0 = max
pQU[0:2]X
min
{
I(U0U1;Y1|Q)− I(U0U1;Z|Q), I(U0U2;Y2|Q)− I(U0U2;Z|Q),
1
2
(
I(U0U1;Y1|Q)− I(U0U1;Z|Q) + I(U0U2;Y2|Q)− I(U0U2;Z|Q)− I(U1;U2|Q,U0, Z)
)}
We now compare our lower bound with the one given in [27]. The lower bound given in [27] is the
maximum of
min
{
I(U0U1;Y1|Q)− I(U0U1;Z|Q), I(U0U2;Y2|Q)− I(U0U2;Z|Q)
)}
over all p(q, u0)p(u1, u2, x|u0)p(y1, y2, z|x) where I(U1, U2;Z|U0) ≤ I(U1;Z|U0)+I(U2;Z|U0)−I(U1;U2|U0).
We first note that because of the Markov chain Q − U0 − U1U2XZY1Y2 the above constraint is equiva-
lent with I(U1, U2;Z|Q,U0) ≤ I(U1;Z|Q,U0) + I(U2;Z|Q,U0)− I(U1;U2|Q,U0). Algebraic manipulation
shows that this constraint holds only when I(U1;U2|Q,U0, Z) = 0. We note that the Markov constraint
Q − U0 − U1U2X can be dropped. This is because given any (Q,U0, U1, U2, X) where the Markov chain
does not hold we can replace U0 with (U0, Q) and find a new set of random variables where the Markov
chain holds and the inner bound expression remains unchanged. To sum this up, the lower bound of [27]
can be rewritten as the maximum of
min
{
I(U0U1;Y1|Q)− I(U0U1;Z|Q), I(U0U2;Y2|Q)− I(U0U2;Z|Q)
)}
over all p(q, u0, u1, u2, x) where I(U1;U2|Q,U0, Z) = 0. It is clear that when I(U1;U2|Q,U0, Z) = 0 our
lower bound reduces to this lower bound. In general it may be higher because we are taking the maximum
over all p(q, u[0:2], x) without any constraints.
4.7 Distributed lossy compression
Problem definition: Consider the problem of distributed lossy compression of two correlated sources X1
and X2 source within desired distortions D1 and D2. In this setting, there are two correlated i.i.d. sources
Xn1 and X
n
2 , distributed according to p(x1, x2), two (stochastic) encoders mapping X nj to Mj ∈ [1 : 2nRj ]
(j = 1, 2), a decoder that reconstructs lossy versions of Xnj , j = 1, 2 (namely Xˆ
n
j , j = 1, 2) and two
bounded distortion measures dj : Xj × Xˆj → [0, dj,max]. A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable at
the distortions (D1, D2), if E(dj(Xnj , Xˆnj )) ≤ Dj + n, where n → 0.
Statement: Here we wish to reprove the known Berger-Tung inner bound for this problem.
Theorem 4 (Berger-Tung inner bound). A rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable with distortions D1 and D2 if
there exist conditional pmf’s p(u1|x1) and p(u2|x2), and two decoding functions xˆ1(u1, u2) and xˆ2(u1, u2)
such that Edj(Xj , Xˆj) ≤ Dj, j = 1, 2 and the following inequalities hold:
R1 > I(X1;U1|U2),
R2 > I(X2;U2|U1),
R1 +R2 > I(X1X2;U1U2).
(52)
Proof. Take some arbitrary p(x1, x2, u1, u2) = p(x1, x2)p(u1|x1)p(u2|x2) and functions xˆ1(u1, u2) and
xˆ2(u1, u2) such that Edj(X, Xˆj) < Dj , j = 1, 2.
Part (1) of the proof: We define two protocols each of which induces a joint distribution on random
variables that are defined during the protocol.
Protocol A. Let (Xn1 , X
n
2 , U
n
1 , U
n
2 ) be i.i.d. and distributed according to p(x1, x2, u1, u2). Fig. 7
illustrates how the source coding side of problem can be used to prove the main problem.
Random Binning: Consider the following random binning:
• For j = 1, 2, to each sequence unj assign uniformly and independently a random two bin indices
mj ∈ [1 : 2nRj ] and fj ∈ [1 : 2nR˜j ],
24
F1
B
Xn1 pU1|X1 U
n
1 B
Xn2 pU2|X2 U
n
2 B
B
F2
D Un[1:2] ⇒ Xˆn1 , Xˆn2
M1
M2
F1
Xn1 PUn1 |Xn1 ,F1 U
n
1 B
Xn2 PUn2 |Xn2 ,F2 U
n
2 B
F2
D Un[1:2] ⇒ Xˆn1 , Xˆn2
M1
M2
Figure 7: (Left) Source coding side of the Berger-Tung problem (Protocol A). Encoder j passes the source Xnj
through a virtual DMC pUj |Xj to get a sequence U
n
j , such that the sequences xˆ
n
1 (U
n
1 , U
n
2 ) and xˆ
n
2 (U
n
1 , U
n
2 ) have
the desired distortions less than D1 and D2 with X
n
1 and X
n
2 , respectively. So we aim to describe U
n
[1:2] for the
decoder to enable it to find the good sequences Xˆn1 and Xˆ
n
2 . We describe U
n
j through two random bins Mj and
Fj , where Mj will serve as the message of encoder j for the receiver in the main problem, while F1, F2 will serve
as the shared randomness. We use SW decoder for decoding. As long as the SW constraints (58) holds, decoder
can reliably decode Un[1:2] and thus the good sequences Xˆ
n
1 and Xˆ
n
2 with the desired distortions. (Right) Coding
for the Berger-Tung problem assisted with the shared randomness (Protocol B). Encoder j passes the source Xnj
and the shared randomness Fj through the reverse encoder to get a sequence U
n
j . Similar to the lossy source
coding problem, one needs to have independence among the shared randomnesses and the sources. This is because
at the last step of proof, we must eliminate the shared randomness by conditioning on an instance of it, without
disturbing the joint distribution of the sources. To get the equivalence between the two protocols, we need to
impose constraints implying Xn1⊥F1 and Xn2⊥F2 (we note that this implies Xn[1:2]⊥F[1:2], due to Markov chain
F1 −X1 −X2 − F2). This is holds as long as R˜j < H(Uj |Xj), j = 1, 2.
• We use a Slepian-Wolf decoder to recover uˆn1 , uˆn2 from (m1,m2, f1, f2). The rate constraints for the
success of this decoder will be imposed later, although this decoder can be conceived even when
there is no guarantee of success.
• Random variables xˆnj , j = 1, 2 are created as functions of (uˆn1 , uˆn2 ) using the two decoding functions
given at the beginning.
The random pmf induced by the random binning, denoted by P , can be expressed as follows:
P (xn[1:2], u
n
[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2], uˆ
n
[1:2]) = p(x
n
[1:2])p(u
n
1 |xn1 )p(un2 |xn2 )P (m1, f1|un1 )P (m2, f2|un2 )PSW (uˆn[1:2]|m[1:2], f[1:2])
= p(xn[1:2])P (u
n
1 , f1|xn1 )P (un2 , f2|xn2 )P (m1|un1 )P (m2|un2 )PSW (uˆn[1:2]|m[1:2], f[1:2])
= p(xn[1:2])P (u
n
1 , f1|xn1 )P (un2 , f2|xn2 )P (m1|un1 )P (m2|un2 )PSW (uˆn[1:2]|m[1:2], f[1:2])
= p(xn[1:2])P (f1|xn1 )P (f2|xn2 )P (un1 |f1, xn1 )P (un2 |f2, xn2 )
× P (m1|un1 )P (m2|un2 )PSW (uˆn[1:2]|m[1:2], f[1:2]) (53)
= P (f[1:2], x
n
[1:2])P (u
n
1 |f1, xn1 )P (un2 |f2, xn2 )
× P (m1|un1 )P (m2|un2 )PSW (uˆn[1:2]|m[1:2], f[1:2]). (54)
We have ignored xˆn1 and xˆ
n
2 from the pmf at this stage since they are functions of other random variables.
They will be introduced later. The relation among random variables and random bin assignments are
depicted in the left diagram of Fig. 7.
Protocol B (coding for the main problem assisted with the shared randomness). In this protocol we
assume that the transmitter and the receiver have access to the shared randomness F[1:2] where F[1:2] is
uniformly distributed over [1 : 2nR˜1 ] × [1 : 2nR˜1 ]. Then, the protocol proceeds as follows (see also the
right diagram of Fig. 7 demonstrating the protocol B):
• For j = 1, 2, the transmitter j generates Unj according to the conditional pmf P (unj |xnj , fj) of
protocol A.
• Next, knowing unj , the transmitter j sends mj which is the bin index of unj . Random variable Mj
is generated according to the conditional pmf P (mj |unj ) of protocol A.
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• At the final stage, the receiver, knowing (m[1:2], f[1:2]) uses the Slepian-Wolf decoder PSW (uˆn1:2|m[1:2], f[1:2])
of protocol A to obtain estimates of un1 and u
n
2 .
The random pmf induced by the protocol, denoted by Pˆ , factors as
Pˆ (xn[1:2], u
n
[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2], uˆ
n
[1:2]) = p
U (f[1:2])p(x
n
[1:2])P (u
n
1 |f1, xn1 )P (un2 |f2, xn2 )
× P (m1|un1 )P (m2|un2 )PSW (uˆn[1:2]|m[1:2], f[1:2]). (55)
Part (2a) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the induced pmfs approximately the same: To
find the constraints that imply that the pmf Pˆ is close to the pmf P in total variation distance, we start
with P and make it close to Pˆ in a few steps. The first step is to observe that in protocol A, f1 is a bin
index of un1 and f2 is a bin index of u
n
2 . Substituting X1 = U1, X2 = U2, Z = X[1:2] in Theorem 1 implies
that Xn[1:2] is nearly independent of F[1:2] and that its pmf is equal to p(x
n
[1:2]), if
R˜1 < H(U1|X1X2) = H(U1|X1),
R˜2 < H(U2|X1X2) = H(U2|X2),
R˜1 + R˜2 < H(U1U2|X1X2) = H(U1|X1) +H(U2|X2), (56)
where we have used the Markov chain U1 − X1 − X2 − U2 to simplify the inequalities (Observe that
the last inequality is redundant. In fact to have the equivalence between the two protocols, one needs
the independence between Fj and Xj for j = 1, 2 due to (53). These independence are guaranteed
as long as the first two inequalities are satisfied.). In other words, the above constraints imply that
P (f[1:2], x
n
[1:2]) ≈ pU (f[1:2])p(xn[1:2]) = Pˆ (f[1:2], xn[1:2]). Equations (54) and (55) imply
Pˆ (xn[1:2], u
n
[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2], uˆ
n
[1:2]) ≈ P (xn[1:2], un[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2], uˆn[1:2]). (57)
Part (2b) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the Slepian-Wolf decoder succeed : The next
step is to see that when the Slepian-Wolf decoder of protocol A can reliably decode the pair (Un1 , U
n
2 ).
Substituting X1 = U1, X2 = U2 in Lemma 1 yields that the decoding of U
n
1 U
n
2 is reliable if,
R1 + R˜1 > H(U1|U2),
R2 + R˜2 > H(U2|U1),
R1 +R2 + R˜1 + R˜2 > H(U1U2).
(58)
It yields
P (xn[1:2], u
n
[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2], uˆ
n
[1:2]) ≈ P (xn[1:2], un[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2])1{uˆn[1:2] = un[1:2]}. (59)
Using equations (57), (59) and the triangle inequality we have
Pˆ (xn[1:2], u
n
[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2], uˆ
n
[1:2]) ≈ P (xn[1:2], un[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2])1{uˆn[1:2] = un[1:2]}. (60)
Part (3) of the proof: Eliminating the shared randomness F[1:2] without disturbing the desired distor-
tions: Using Definition 1, equation (60) guarantees existence of a fixed binning with the corresponding
pmf p such that if we replace P with p in (55) and denote the resulting pmf with pˆ, then
pˆ(xn[1:2], u
n
[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2], uˆ
n
[1:2]) ≈ p(xn[1:2], un[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2])1{uˆn[1:2] = un[1:2]}
:= p˜(xn[1:2], u
n
[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2], uˆ
n
[1:2]).
Using part one of lemma 4 we can introduce xˆ1 and xˆ2 in the above equation. Random variable xˆ
n
1 was
a function of uˆn[1:2] and xˆ
n
2 was a function of uˆ
n
[1:2].
pˆ(xn[1:2], u
n
[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2], uˆ
n
[1:2], xˆ
n
[1:2]) ≈ p(xn[1:2], un[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2])1{uˆn[1:2] = un[1:2]}p(xˆn[1:2]|uˆn1:2)
:= p˜(xn[1:2], u
n
[1:2],m[1:2], f[1:2], uˆ
n
[1:2], xˆ
n
[1:2]).
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Note that because of the indicator function terms in p˜, p˜(Xn1 , X
n
2 , Xˆ
n
1 , Xˆ
n
2 ) is an i.i.d. marginal distribu-
tion according to the pmf that we started with at the beginning. Thus, under the probability measure p˜
the distortion constraints Edj(Xnj , Xˆnj ) < Dj , j = 1, 2 are satisfied. Using the first part of lemma 4 we
can drop all the random variables except xn1 , x
n
2 , xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 to get:
pˆ(xn1 , x
n
2 , xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 )
n≈ p˜(xn1 , xn2 , xˆn1 , xˆn2 ), (61)
for some vanishing sequence n. Remember that the pmf pˆ associated to Protocol B which was appro-
priate for coding.
Unlike the previous case of lossy source coding where we used the law of iterated expectation at this
stage, we need to use a concentration result since we are dealing with two distortion functions. Since
p˜(Xn1 , X
n
2 , Xˆ
n
1 , Xˆ
n
2 ) is an i.i.d. distribution we can use the weak law of large number (WLLN) to get that
dj(X
n
j , Xˆ
n
j )→ Ep˜dj(Xnj , Xˆnj ) < Dj , in p˜Xnj Xˆnj .
Thus there exists δn → 0 such that
p˜{(xn1 , xn2 , xˆn1 , xˆn2 ) : dj(xnj , xˆnj ) < Dj , j = 1, 2} ≥ 1− δn.
Using equation (61), the probability of the same set with respect to pˆ should be converging to one, that
is
pˆ{(xn1 , xn2 , xˆn1 , xˆn2 ) : dj(xn, xˆnj ) < Dj , j = 1, 2} ≥ 1− n − δn.
Thus, there exists some f[1:2] such that
pˆ({(xn1 , xn2 , xˆn1 , xˆn2 ) : dj(xnj , xˆnj ) < Dj , j = 1, 2}|F[1:2] = f[1:2]) ≥ 1− n − δn.
This would imply that
EpˆXn
j
Xˆn
j
|F[1:2]=f[1:2]
[dj(X
n
j , Xˆ
n
j )] < Dj + (n + δn)dj,max,
where we have used the fact that the distortion functions are bounded.
Finally, specifying p(mj |xnj , fj) as the encoder j, j = 1, 2 (which is equivalent to generating a random
sequence unj according to p(u
n
j |xnj , fj) and then transmitting the bin index mj assigned to unj ) and
(pSW (uˆn[1:2]|m[1:2], f[1:2]), xˆn[1:2](uˆn[1:2])) as the decoder results in a pair of encoder-decoder obeying the
desired distortion.
To get the region of (52), it suffices to choose R˜j = H(Uj |Xj)−  in inequalities (56) and (58), where
 is arbitrarily small.
4.8 Lossy coding over broadcast channels
Problem definition: Consider the problem of lossy transmission of an i.i.d. source Sn distributed according
to p(s), over the broadcast channel p(y1, y2|x). Here, the sender wishes to communicate the source to
the two receivers within desired distortions (D1, D2). Formally, there are
• an encoder that assigns a random sequence xn to each sn according to penc(xn|sn),
• two decoders, where decoder j = 1, 2 assigns an estimate sˆnj ∈ Sˆj to each ynj according to
pdecj (sˆnj |ynj ),
• two distortion measures dj(s, sˆj).
A distortion pair (D1, D2) is said to be achievable, if there exists a sequence of encoder-decoder such
that Edj(Sn, Sˆnj ) ≤ Dj + n, j = 1, 2 and n → 0.
We now state a new result on the above problem:
27
Theorem 5. A distortion pair (D1, D2) is achievable for the lossy transmission of the source S over
the broadcast channel p(y1y2|x), if there exist a pmf p(u[0:2]), an encoding function x(u[0:2], s) and two
decoding functions sˆ1(u0, u1, y1) and sˆ2(u0, u2, y2) such that Edj(S, Sˆj) ≤ Dj, j = 1, 2 and the following
inequalities hold:
I(U0Uj ;S) < I(U0Uj ;Yj) , j = 1, 2,
I(U[0:2];S) + I(U1;U2|U0) < min {I(U0;Y1), I(U0;Y2)}+ I(U1;Y1|U0) + I(U2;Y2|U0),
I(U0U1;S) + I(U0U2;S) < I(U0U1;Y1) + I(U0U2;Y2)− I(U1;U2|U0S). (62)
Remark 7. The above result is related to the result of Han and Costa, [26, 28] for the lossless trans-
mission of correlated sources over broadcast channels when S is of the form (S1, S2). In this case we can
include S1 in U1, and S2 in U2. If we take the distortion function to be the Hamming distance function,
the above bound reduces to a weaker version of the result of Han and Costa since instead of a vanishing
probability of error we have a vanishing distortion. However the proof can be modified to recover the
result of [26].
Proof. Take some arbitrary p(s, u[0:2], y1, y2) and functions x(u[0:2], s), sˆ1(u0, u1, y1) and sˆ2(u0, u2, y2)
such that Edj(S, Sˆj) < Dj , j = 1, 2.
Part (1) of the proof: We define two protocols each of which induces a joint distribution on random
variables that are defined during the protocol.
Protocol A. Let (Sn, Un[0:2], Y
n
1 , Y
n
2 ) be i.i.d. and distributed according to p(s, u[0:2], y1, y2).
Random Binning: Consider the following random binning:
• To each sequence un0 assign uniformly and independently a random bin index f0 ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ],
• For j = 1, 2, to each pair (un0 , unj ) assign uniformly and independently a random bin index fj ∈ [1 :
2nRj ],
• We use a Slepian-Wolf decoder to recover uˆn0,1, uˆn1 from (yn1 , f0, f1), and another Slepian-Wolf de-
coder to recover uˆn0,2, uˆ
n
2 from (y
n
2 , f0, f2). Note that we denote the two estimates of u
n
0 by the two
receivers with uˆn0,1 and uˆ
n
0,2. The rate constraints for the success of these decoders will be imposed
later, although these decoders can be conceived even when there is no guarantee of success.
• Random variable sˆn1 is created as a function of (uˆn0 , uˆn1 , yn1 ) and sˆn2 is created as function of
(uˆn0 , uˆ
n
2 , y
n
2 ) using the two decoding functions given at the beginning.
The random pmf induced by the random binning, denoted by P , can be expressed as follows:
P (sn, un[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , f[0:2], uˆ
n
0,1, uˆ
n
1 , uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 ) = p(s
n, un[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 )P (f[0:2]|un[0:2])PSW (uˆn0,1, uˆn1 |yn1 , f0, f1)
× PSW (uˆn0,2, uˆn2 |yn2 , f0, f2)
= P (f[0:2], s
n, un[0:2])p(y
n
[1:2]|un[0:2], sn)PSW (uˆn0,1, uˆn1 |yn1 , f0, f1)
× PSW (uˆn0,2, uˆn2 |yn2 , f0, f2)
= P (f[0:2], s
n)P (un[0:2]|f[0:2], sn)p(yn[1:2]|un[0:2], sn)PSW (uˆn0,1, uˆn1 |yn1 , f0, f1)
× PSW (uˆn0,2, uˆn2 |yn2 , f0, f2). (63)
We have ignored sˆn1 and sˆ
n
2 from the pmf at this stage since they are functions of other random variables.
They will be introduced later.
Protocol B. In this protocol we assume that the transmitter and the two receivers have access to the
shared randomness F[0:2] where F[0:2] is uniformly distributed over [1 : 2
nR0 ] × [1 : 2nR1 ] × [1 : 2nR2 ].
Observe that this implies that F0, F1 and F2 are mutually independent. Then, the protocol proceeds as
follows:
• The transmitter generates Un[0:2] according to the conditional pmf P (un[0:2]|sn, f[0:2]) of protocol A.
• Next, Xn is computed from (Un[0:2], Sn) using n copies of the function x(u[0:2], s) (the arbitrary
function we chose at the beginning). R.v. Xn is transmitted over the broadcast channel.
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• At the final stage, the receiver j = 1, 2, knowing (ynj , f0, fj) uses the Slepian-Wolf decoder
PSW (uˆn0,j , uˆ
n
j |ynj , f0, fj) of protocol A to obtain estimates of un0 and unj . We note that while the
receiver j = 1, 2 knows f0, f1 and f2, it uses only f0, fj in its Slepian-Wolf decoder.
• Random variable sˆn1 is created as a function of (uˆn0,1, uˆn1 , yn1 ) and sˆn2 is created as function of
(uˆn0,2, uˆ
n
2 , y
n
2 ) using the two decoding functions given at the beginning.
The random pmf induced by the protocol, denoted by Pˆ , factors as
Pˆ (sn, un[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , f[0:2], uˆ
n
0,1, uˆ
n
1 , uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 ) =
pU (f[0:2])p(s
n)P (un[0:2]|sn, f[0:2])p(yn[1:2]|un[0:2], sn)PSW (uˆn0,1, uˆn1 |yn1 , f0, f1)PSW (uˆn0,2, uˆn2 |yn2 , f0, f2). (64)
Again we have ignored sˆn1 and sˆ
n
2 from the pmf at this stage since they are functions of other random
variables.
Part (2a) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the induced pmfs approximately the same:
To find the constraints that imply that the pmf Pˆ is close to the pmf P in total variation distance,
we start with P and make it close to Pˆ in a few steps. The first step is to observe that in protocol
A, f0 is a bin index of u
n
0 , f1 is a bin index of (u
n
0 , u
n
1 ) and f2 is a bin index of (u
n
0 , u
n
2 ). Substituting
X1 = U0, X2 = U0U1, X3 = U0U2, Z = S in Theorem 1 implies that S
n is nearly independent of F[0:2]
and that its pmf is close to p(sn), if
R0 < H(U0|S),
R0 +Rj < H(U0Uj |S) , j = 1, 2,
R0 +R1 +R2 < H(U[0:2]|S). (65)
In other words, the above constraints imply that P (f[0:2], s
n) ≈ pU (f[0:2])p(sn) = Pˆ (f[0:2], sn). Equations
(63) and (64) imply
Pˆ (sn, un[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , f[0:2], uˆ
n
0,1, uˆ
n
1 , uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 ) ≈ P (sn, un[0:2], yn1 , yn2 , f[0:2], uˆn0,1, uˆn1 , uˆn0,2, uˆn2 ). (66)
Part (2b) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the Slepian-Wolf decoder succeed : The next
step is to see that when the Slepian-Wolf decoder j, j = 1, 2 of protocol A can reliably decode the pair
(Un0 , U
n
j ). Lemma 1 for X1 = U0, X2 = U0Uj , Z = Yj yields that the decoding of U
n
0 U
n
j is reliable if,
R0 +Rj > H(U0Uj |Yj),
Rj > H(Uj |U0Yj) for j = 1, 2. (67)
It yields
P (sn, un[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , f[0:2], uˆ
n
0,1, uˆ
n
1 , uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 ) ≈ P (sn, un[0:2], yn1 , yn2 , f[0:2])
× 1{uˆn0,1 = uˆn0,2 = un0 , uˆn1 = un1 , uˆn2 = un2}. (68)
Using equations (66), (68) and the triangle inequality we have
Pˆ (sn, un[0:2], y
n
1 , y
n
2 , f[0:2], uˆ
n
0,1, uˆ
n
1 , uˆ
n
0,2, uˆ
n
2 ) ≈ P (sn, un[0:2], yn1 , yn2 , f[0:2])
× 1{uˆn0,1 = uˆn0,2 = un0 , uˆn1 = un1 , uˆn2 = un2}. (69)
Part (3) of the proof: Eliminating the shared randomness F[0:2] without disturbing the desired dis-
tortions: The proof of this part follows exactly the same step used in the Part (3) of the proof of
Berger-Tung. Following exactly the same steps used in the Part (3) of the proof of Berger-Tung, we find
f[0:2] such that
EpˆSnSˆn
j
|F[0:2]=f[0:2]
[d(Sn, Sˆnj )] < Dj + (n + δn)dj,max.
Specifying (p(un[0:2]|f[0:2], sn), xn(un[0:2], sn)) as the encoder and (pSW (uˆ0,j , uˆj |ynj , f0, fj), sˆnj (uˆ0,j , uˆj , ynj ))
as the decoder j results in encoder and decoders obeying the desired distortions.
Finally applying FME on (67) and (65) gives (62).
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Remark 8 (Connection to Hybrid coding [30]). In this problem, the OSRB framework has a close relation
to the hybrid coding approach. Hybrid coding [30] is a recent approach for establishing achievability
results for the joint source-channel coding scenarios. In this approach the same code (codebook) is used
for both source coding and channel coding. Observing the source, the encoder adopts a codeword from
the codebook and then generates the channel input as the symbol-by-symbol function of the codeword and
the source. Similarly observing the channel output, the decoder adopts a codeword from the codebook and
then generates the source estimate as the symbol-by-symbol function of the codeword and the channel
output.
Although in OSRB proof of Theorem 5 we did not deal with codebook explicitly but one can find
similarity between it and hybrid coding as follows:
• Conditioned on an instance F[0:2] = f[0:2] of the shared randomness, the inputs and the outputs
of encoder and decoders are limited to those sequence assigned to f[0:2]. Thus one can interpret
these sequences as codewords of a codebook. The encoder generates the codeword Un[0:2] according
to p(un[0:2]|f[0:2], sn) and the decoder j attempts to find (Un0 , Unj ). So the same codebook has been
used for both of the encoder and decoders. In particular, p(un[0:2]|f[0:2], sn) can be regarded as source
encoder (compressor) and the SW decoder (conditioned on an instance of shared randomness) can
be interpreted as the channel decoder. In fact, this is a general phenomenon in OSRB framework,
which is not restricted to joint source-channel coding problems.
• As in hybrid coding, we use symbol-by-symbol function to map the codeword and the source to
channel input. Also, we use symbol-by-symbol function to map the codeword and the channel
output to a source estimate.
The OSRB framework provides an alternative and straightforward achievability proof for hybrid coding
scheme. Further, in [37] we proposed a hybrid coding based achievability proof using OSRB framework
for the problem of channel simulation (synthesis) using another channel. To best of our knowledge, there
is no known solution for this problem using the traditional approach based on codebook generation.
4.9 Relay channel with/without secrecy
Until now, we only considered one-hop networks. In this section we investigate our framework for multi-
hop setting through studying wiretap relay channel. As other applications of the OSRB framework in
multi-hopping setting, please see [35] and [36]. In particular, our proof for the problem of interactive
channel simulation (synthesis) [35] is a reminiscent of two well-known strategies for relay channel, namely
decode-forward and compress-forward.
In this subsection, we prove noisy network coding inner bound [31] for relay channel and its extension
to wiretap relay channel. Extension to multiple relays is also possible, but for simplicity we only consider
one relay.
Problem definition: Consider the problem of secure transmission over a relay channel with a wiretap-
per, p(yr, y, z|x, xr), where X and Xr are the channel inputs at transmitter and relay, respectively and
Yr, Y, Z are the channel outputs at the relay, receiver and eavesdropper, respectively. Here, we wish to
securely transmit a message m ∈ [1 : 2nR] to the receiver Y with the help of the relay, while concealing it
from the eavesdropper. We again use the strong notion of secrecy as a measure for analyzing the secrecy.
Formally there are,
• A message M which is uniformly distributed,
• A stochastic encoder at transmitter which maps the message to a channel input xn according to
penc(xn|m),
• A set of stochastic relay-encoding functions penc,relayt (xr,t|yt−1r , xt−1r ), t = 1, · · · , n mapping the
sequence (yt−1r , xt−1r ) to a channel input xr,t at time t,6
6 In a relay channel without an eavesdropper, the sequence xr,t can be taken to be a deterministic function of y
t−1
r (relay
randomization could only confuse the receivers); thus xr,t is implicitly related to its past sequence x
t−1
r . However in the
presence of an eavesdropper, the relay might randomize to confuse the adversary and we cannot remove the dependency of
xr,t on x
t−1
r .
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• A decoder that assigns an estimate mˆ of m to each yn.
A secrecy rate R is said to be achievable if Pr{Mˆ 6= M} → 0 and M is nearly independent of the
wiretapper output, Zn, that is, ∥∥p(m, zn)− pUM(m)p(zn)∥∥1 → 0,
where, here p(zn) is the induced pmf on Zn and is not an i.i.d. pmf. The secrecy capacity Cs is the
supremum of the set of all achievable secrecy rate.
To show the applicability of our framework in complicated networks, we prove an extension of noisy
network coding inner bound for relay channel to include an eavesdropper. In fact, we again show
that adding secrecy is simple using the OSRB framework. We have adopted noisy network coding for
investigation since it has a simpler analysis compared to other relaying protocols such as decode-forward
or compress-forward. However, these protocols can also be studied using the OSRB framework.
Theorem 6. The secrecy capacity of relay channel with an eavesdropper is lower bounded as
Cs ≥ sup
{
max
{
RNNC −RBC−Z,
min{RNNC − I(U ;Z), RMAC−Y −RMAC−Z}
}}
,
(70)
where
RBC−Y = I(U ;Y Yˆr|Ur),
RBC−Z = I(U ;ZYˆr|Ur),
RMAC−Y = I(UUr;Y )− I(Yr; Yˆr|UUrY ),
RMAC−Z = I(UUr;Z)− I(Yr; Yˆr|UUrZ),
RNNC = min{RBC−Y, RMAC−Y},
and the supremum is taken over all joint p.m.f of (u, x, ur, xr, yr, y, z, yˆr) factor as
p(u, x)p(ur, xr)p(yr, y, z|x, xr)p(yˆr|ur, yr).
Remark 9. If we disable the compression part of NNC by setting Yˆr = φ, the NNC strategy reduces
to noise forwarding strategy and we obtain the achievable secrecy rate of [32, Theorem 3] under strong
secrecy criterion.
Remark 10. In [33, Corollary 3.1], a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of deterministic networks is
derived. For the special case of deterministic relay channel, we can establish this corollary using Theorem
6 by setting Yˆr = Yr.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let U = X and Ur = Xr.
Take some arbitrary p(x, xr, yr, y, z, yˆr) = p(x)p(xr)p(yr, y, z|x, xr)p(yˆr|xr, yr).
Part (1) of the proof: We define two protocols each of which induces a joint distribution on random
variables that are defined during the protocol. Fix an arbitrarily large integer number B.
Protocol A. Let (XnB, XnBr , Y
nB
r , Y
nB, ZnB, Yˆ nBr ) be i.i.d. and distributed according to p(x, xr, yr, y, z, yˆr).
We divide these sequences to B blocks and denote the sub-sequences in the block b ∈ [1 : B] by index
(b). Observe that the sequence of r.v.s
{
(Xn(b), X
n
r,(b), Y
n
r,(b), Y
n
(b), Z
n
(b), Yˆ
n
r,(b))
}B
b=1
is mutually independent
and has the same distribution over the blocks.
Random Binning: Consider the following random binning:
• To each xnB = xn([1:B]) = (xn(1), xn(2), · · · , xn(B)) assign uniformly and independently two random bin
indices m ∈ [1 : 2nBR] and f ∈ [1 : 2nBR˜] (this resembles the repetition of a message in the noisy
network coding scenario, because we considered only one message for all blocks),
• For b = 1, 2, · · · , B − 1, to each tuple (yˆnr,(1), xnr,(2), yˆnr,(2), xnr,(3), · · · , yˆnr,(b), xnr,(b+1)) assign uniformly
and independently a random bin index fr,(b) ∈ [1 : 2nR˜r ]. This bin will be used to convey some
information about (yˆnr,([1:b]), x
n
r,([2:b+1])) to receiver in the block b+ 1.
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• We use a Slepian-Wolf decoder to obtain an estimate xˆnB of xnB from (yn([1:B]), f, fr,([1:B−1])).
• Random variable Mˆ is created as a bin index assigned to XˆnB.
The random pmf induced by the random binning, denoted by P , can be expressed as follows:
P (xnB, xnBr , y
nB
r , y
nB, znB, yˆnBr ,m, f, fr,([1:B−1]), xˆ
nB) = p(xnB, xnBr , y
nB
r , y
nB, znB, yˆnBr )P (m, f |xnB)
×
[
B−1∏
b=1
P (fr,(b)|yˆnr,([1:b]), xnr,([2:b+1]))
]
PSW (xˆnB|yn[1:B], f, fr,[1:B−1])
= P (xnB,m, f)p(xnr,(1))
[
B∏
b=1
p(ynr,(b), y
n
(b), z
n
(b)|xn(b), xnr,(b))p(yˆnr,(b)|ynr,(b), xnr,(b))p(xnr,(b+1))P (fr,(b)|yˆnr,([1:b]), xnr,([2:b+1]))
]
× PSW (xˆnB|yn[1:B], f, fr,[1:B−1])
= P (xnB,m, f)p(xnr,(1))
[
B∏
b=1
p(ynr,(b), y
n
(b), z
n
(b)|xn(b), xnr (b))P (yˆnr,(b), xnr,(b+1), fr,(b)|yˆnr,([1:b−1]), xnr,([2:b]), ynr,(b))
]
× PSW (xˆnB|yn[1:B], f, fr,[1:B−1])
= P (m, f)P (xnB|m, f)p(xnr,(1))
[
B∏
b=1
p(ynr,(b), y
n
(b), z
n
(b)|xn(b), xnr,(b))P (fr,(b)|yˆnr,([1:b−1]), xnr,([2:b]), ynr,(b))
P (yˆnr,(b), x
n
r,(b+1)|fr,(b), yˆnr,[1:b−1]), xnr,([2:b]), ynr,(b))
]
× PSW (xˆnB|yn[1:B], f, fr,[1:B−1]) (71)
Protocol B. In this protocol we assume that the transmitter, the relay, the receiver and the wiretapper
have access to the shared randomness (F, Fr,([1:B−1])) where (F, Fr,([1:B−1])) is uniformly distributed over
[1 : 2nR˜] × [1 : 2nR˜r ]B−1. Observe that this implies that F , Fr,(1), Fr,(2), · · · , Fr,(B−1) are mutually
independent. Then, the protocol proceeds as follows:
• Encoding at transmitter:
1. The transmitter chooses a message m uniformly distributed over [1 : 2nBR] and independently
of (F, Fr,([1:B−1])).
2. The transmitter generates xnB according to the conditional pmf P (xnB|m, f) of protocol A.
R.v. Xn(b) is transmitted over the channel in the block b.
• Encoding at relay:
1. In the first block the relay generates an i.i.d. sequence xnr,(1) according to the pmf p(xr) and
sends it over the channel.
2. At the end of block b ∈ [1 : B−1], knowing (fr,(b), yˆnr,([1:b−1]), xnr,([2:b]), ynr,(b)) the relay generates
(yˆnr,(b), x
n
r,(b+1)) according to conditional pmf P (yˆ
n
r,(b), x
n
r,(b+1)|fr,(b), yˆnr,([1:b−1]), xnr,([2:b]), ynr,(b)) of
protocol A. Then the relay transmits xnr,(b+1) in the block b+ 1.
• Decoding at receiver:
1. At the final stage, the receiver acquiring (ynB, f, fr,([1:B−1])) uses the Slepian-Wolf decoder
PSW (xˆnB|yn([1:B]), f, fr,([1:B−1])) of protocol A to obtain an estimate of xnB.
2. We use the output of the SW decoder for decoding of the messages M . In protocol A, we
constructed M as a bin index of XnB. Here upon obtaining the estimate XˆnB of XnB, decoder
declares the bin index Mˆ assigned to XˆnB as the estimate of the transmitted message.
The random pmf induced by the protocol, denoted by Pˆ , factors as
Pˆ (xnB, xnBr , y
nB
r , y
nB, znB, yˆnBr ,m, f, fr,([1:B−1])), xˆ
nB) = pU (m)pU (f)P (xnB|m, f)p(xnr,(1))
[
B∏
b=1
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pU (fr,(b))p(y
n
r,(b), y
n
(b), z
n
(b)|xn(b), xnr,(b))
P (yˆnr,(b), x
n
r,(b+1)|fr,(b), yˆnr,([1:b−1]), xnr,([2:b]), ynr,(b))
]
× PSW (xˆnB|yn[1:B], f, fr,[1:B−1]). (72)
We have ignored Mˆ from the pmf at this stage since they are (random) functions of other random
variables.
Part (2a) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the induced pmfs approximately the same: To
find the constraints that imply that the pmf Pˆ is close to the pmf P in total variation distance, we start
with P and make it close to Pˆ in a few steps. Comparing the relations for the pmfs P and Pˆ in (71) and
(72), respectively, suggests that the conditions P (m, f) ≈ pU (m)pU (f) and P (fr,(b)|yˆnr,([1:b−1]), xnr,([1:b]), ynr,(b)) ≈
pU (fr,(b)) (more precisely, P (fr,(b), yˆ
n
r,([1:b−1]), x
n
r,([1:b]), y
n
r,(b)) ≈ pU (fr,(b))P (yˆnr,([1:b−1]), xnr,([1:b]), ynr,(b))) are
sufficient to approximate P by Pˆ . We relegate the prove of the sufficiency of these approximations to
Appendix E.
Since M and F are both random bins of XnBR, Theorem 1 yields that if
R+ R˜ < H(X), (73)
then P (m, f) ≈ pU (m)pU (f). Also Fr,(b) is a random bin number assigned to (Yˆ nr,([1:b]), Xnr,([2:b+1])).
Theorem 1 implies that the following constraint is sufficient for the (nearly) independence of Fr,(b) and
(Yˆ nr,([1:b−1]), X
n
r,([1:b]), Y
n
r,(b)),
R˜r < H(Yˆr,([1:b]), Xr,([2:b+1])|Yˆr,([1:b−1]), Xr,([1:b]), Yr,(b))
= H(Yˆr,(b)|Xr,(b)Yr,(b)) +H(Xr,(b+1))
= H(Yˆr|XrYr) +H(Xr), (74)
where we used the independence among blocks and the fact that the pmf of r.v.’s is the same over all the
blocks, that is, p(x(b), xr,(b), yˆr,(b), yr,(b), y(b), z(b)) = p(x, xr, yˆr, yr, y, z). Thus we can writeH(Yˆr,(b)|Xr,(b)Yr,(b))+
H(Xr,(b+1)) as H(Yˆr|XrYr) +H(Xr). This observation will be used in the rest of the proof.
Part (2b) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the Slepian-Wolf decoder succeed : The next
step is to see that when the Slepian-Wolf decoder of protocol A can reliably decode the transmitted
sequence XnB = Xn(1:B). Setting X1 = X(1:B), Y = Y(1:B), Xb = (Yˆr,(1:b−1), Xr,(2:b)) for b = 2, · · · , B in
Lemma 2 gives the following constraints for the success of the decoder:7
BR˜ > H(X(1:B)|Yˆr,(1:B−1)Xr,(2:B)Y(1:B))
= H(X(1)|Yˆr,(1)Y(1)) +
B−1∑
b=2
H(X(b)|Yˆr,(b)Xr,(b)Y(b)) +H(XB|Xr,BYB)
= H(X|YˆrY ) + (B − 2)H(X|YˆrXrY ) +H(X|XrY )
= BH(X|YˆrXrY ) + C1, (75)
for b = 1 : B − 2, BR˜+ bR˜ > H
(
X(1:B)Yˆr,(B−b:B−1)Xr,(B−b+1:B)|Y(1:B), Yˆr,(1:B−b−1)Xr,(2:B−b)
)
= H(X|YˆrY ) + (B − b− 2)H(X|YˆrXrY ) +H(XYˆr|XrY )
+ (b− 1)H(XYˆrXr|Y ) +H(XXr|Y )
= (B − b)H(X|YˆrXrY ) + bH(XYˆrXr|Y ) + C1, (76)
BR˜+ (B − 1)R˜r > H(X(1:B)Yˆr,(1:B−1)Xr,(2:B)|Y(1:B))
= H(X|YˆrXrY ) + (B − 1)H(XYˆrXr|Y ) + C2, (77)
7Here we only write the constraints associated to the subsets of [2 : B] of the form [2 : i], 2 ≤ i ≤ B and omit
the others, because the unwritten constraints are redundant. It is because the random variables Xb are nested r.v.’s.
Each subset of [2 : B] can be written as S = {m1,m2, · · · ,mk} where {mj}kj=1 is an increasing sequence. In this case
XS = (Yˆr,(1:mk−1), Xr,(2:mk)) = X[2:mk] and the corresponding constraint is implied by the constraint associated to [2 : mk].
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where in (75)-(77) where we again use the independence among blocks and the fact that the pmf of r.v.’s
is the same over all the blocks. Moreover C1 and C2 are finite constant not depending on B (formed by
taking leftover terms all together as a constant). Now (75)-(77) yield that (for sufficiently large B) the
following constraints are sufficient for the success of the SW decoders:
R˜ > H(X|XrYˆrY ), (78)
R˜+ R˜r > H(XXrYˆr|Y ). (79)
Using the approximation of P by Pˆ and similar argument to the one used in the previous models (for
example, equations (44)-(48) for wiretap broadcast channel), we get
Pˆ (m, f, fr,(1:b), mˆ, z
n
(1:B)) ≈ P (m, f, fr,(1:b), zn(1:B))1{mˆ = m}. (80)
Before we consider the secrecy part of problem, we assume that there is no eavesdropper, i.e. Z =
constant. So we deal with the relay channel. It can be easily seen that the constraints (73), (74), (78)
and (79) imply the noisy network coding inner bound for the relay channel. In the sequel, we show how
one can easily find an extension of noisy network coding inner bound for wiretap relay channel.
Part (2c) of the proof: Sufficient conditions that make the protocols secure: We must take care of
independence of M , and (Zn([1:B]), F, Fr,([1:B−1])) consisting of the wiretapper’s output and the shared
randomness. We use Corollary 1 with two different choices for V to get two different sufficient condi-
tions for (nearly) mutual independence among M , F and (Zn([1:B]), Fr,([1:B−1])). In other words, we find
constraints that imply
P (m, f, fr,(1:b), z
n
(1:B)) ≈ pU (m)pU (f)P (fr,(1:B), , zn(1:B)). (81)
Using equations (80) and (81) and the third part of Lemma 4 we have
Pˆ (m, f, fr,(1:b), mˆ, z
n
(1:B)) ≈ pU (m)pU (f)P (fr,(1:B), , zn(1:B)))1{mˆ = m}. (82)
• Setting T = B, V = ∅, Z = Z(1:B), X1 = X(1:B), Xb = (Yˆr,(1:b−1), Xr,(2:b)) for b = 2, · · · , B in
Corollary 1 shows that the following constraints imply the desired independence,
B(R+ R˜) < H(X(1:B)|Z(1:B)) = BH(X|Z), (83)
for b = 1 : B − 1, B(R+ R˜) + bR˜r < H(X(1:B)Yˆr,(1:b)Xr,(2:b+1)|Z(1:B))
= H(XYˆr|Z) + (b− 1)H(XYˆrXr|Z) +H(XXr|Z)
+ (B − b+ 1)H(X|Z)
= (B − b)H(X|Z) + bH(XYˆrXr|Z) + C3, (84)
where C3 is a finite constant number (not depending on B). Observe that if the following constraint
and (83) hold, then for sufficiently large B the constraint (84) is satisfied,
R+ R˜+ R˜r < H(XXrYˆr|Z). (85)
• Setting T = B, V = [2 : B], Z = Z(1:B), X1 = X(1:B), Xb = (Yˆr,(1:b−1), Xr,(2:b)) for b = 2, · · · , B in
Corollary 1 yields the following constraint for having the desired independence,
B(R+ R˜) < H(X(1:B)|Yˆr,(1:B−1)Xr,(2:B)Z(1:B)) = (B − 2)H(X|YˆrXrZ) + C4, (86)
where C4 is a finite constant number (not depending on B). Observe that if the following constraint
holds, then for sufficiently large B the constraint (86) is satisfied,
R+ R˜ < H(X|YˆrXrZ), (87)
Part (3) of the proof: Eliminating the shared randomness (F, Fr,([1:B−1])) without disturbing the
secrecy and reliability requirements: This can be done by applying the same argument as in the part
(3) of the proof of wiretap broadcast channel to (82) and thus omitted.
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Finally, identifying p(xnB|m, f) as the encoder, P (yˆnr,(b), xnr,(b+1)|fr,(b), yˆnr,([1:b−1]), xnr,([2:b]), ynr,(b)) as the
relay encoder for block b = 2, · · · , B, and the Slepian-Wolf decoder as decoder results in reliable and
secure encoders-decoder.
Applying FME on (73), (74), (78), (79) and (87) results in the first term in the maximization of (70).
Applying FME on (73), (74), (78), (79), (83) and (85) results in the second term in the maximization of
(70).
5 Covering and Packing: Revisited
Most of the achievability proofs in NIT are based on two primitive lemmas, namely packing lemma and
covering lemma [1]. Thus it would be interesting to see how our probabilistic proofs relate to these
lemmas. We show that Theorem 1 implies a certain form of multivariate covering (but not exactly the
one mentioned in [1]). The discussion on packing lemma is similar and hence omitted.
Multivariate covering : We prove a version of multivariate covering that is similar to Marton coding
[1]. Consider r.v.’s X[1:T ]Z. Roughly speaking, we want to prove that under certain conditions on Ri’s,
there exists a partition of set of typical sequences of X ni into 2nRi bins of size 2nR
′
i = 2n(H(Xi)−Ri) for
i = 1 : T , such that if we choose any of the partitions of X n1 , and any of the partitions of X n2 , etc, we
can find sequences xn1 , x
n
2 ,..., x
n
T in these partitions such that they are jointly typical with each other
and with Zn with high probability, for almost all choice of partitions. The conditions imposed on the
rate of the bins, R′i are given in inequality (88). This is a generalization of the mutual information terms
showing up in Marton coding and match the ones reported in [1].
To show this let T n [X[1:T ]Z] be the set of strongly typical sequences w.r.t. pX[1:T ]Z . Theorem 1 says
that if
∀S ⊆ [1 : T ] :
∑
t∈S
R′t >
∑
t∈S
H(Xt)−H(XS |Z), (88)
then P (b[1:T ], z
n) ≈ pU (b[1:T ])p(zn). One can show that with high probability the number of the typical
sequences assigned to each bin bi ∈ [1 : 2nRi ] is about 2nR′i , for i = 1 : T , provided that Ri < H(Xi)
(for example, through the same lines as in the proof of balanced coloring lemma in [34]). This fact
alongside with Theorem 1 implies that there exists a fixed binning with the corresponding pmf p¯ such that
p¯(zn, b[1:T ]) ≈ pU (b[1:T ])p(zn) and the number of the typical sequences assigned to each bin bi ∈ [1 : 2nRi ]
is about 2nR
′
i , provided that (88) is satisfied. Let q(b[1:T ], x
n
[1:T ], z
n) = pU (b[1:T ])p(z
n)p¯(xn[1:T ]|b, zn). Since
p¯(xn[1:T ], z
n) = p(xn[1:T ], z
n), we have p¯(T n [X[1:T ]Z]c) < n → 0. Markov inequality and q ≈ p¯ imply that
qB[1:T ]({b[1:T ] : q(T n [X[1:T ]Z]c|b[1:T ]) >
√
n}) → 0. Therefore for almost all the choices of b[1:T ], the
probability of the typical set conditioned on b[1:T ] is large, implying a non-zero intersection of the typical
set and the product partition set.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We prove a one-shot version of Theorem 1 via bounding the fidelity between two pmfs over a same
alphabet.
Definition 3. For two pmfs pX and qX , the fidelity (or Bhattacharyya coefficient) is defined as:
F (pX ; qX) =
∑
x∈X
√
pX(x)qX(x). (89)
Fidelity measures the similarity between two pmfs and has wide applications in quantum information
theory. We always have 0 ≤ F (pX ; qX) ≤ 1. The following well-known lemma gives an upper bound on
the total variation distance in terms of fidelity (a similar statement holds for fidelity and trace distance
of two arbitrary quantum states).
Lemma 6. For two pmf pX and qX , we have
‖pX − qX‖1 ≤
√
1− F 2(pX ; qX).
Using Jensen’s inequality for the concave function f(x) =
√
1− x2 and the above lemma, we get the
following upper bound on the expected total variation between two random pmfs PX and QX via the
expected fidelity.
Lemma 7. For two random pmf PX and QX , we have
E ‖PX −QX‖1 ≤
√
1− (E [F (PX ;QX)])2.
In particular if for two sequences P
(n)
X(n)
and Q
(n)
X(n)
of random pmfs, E
[
F (P
(n)
X(n)
;Q
(n)
X(n)
)
]
→ 1, then
E
∥∥∥P (n)
X(n)
−Q(n)
X(n)
∥∥∥
1
→ 0.
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Definition 4. A distributed random binning of correlated sources X[1:T ], Z consists of a set of random
mappings Bi : X → [1 : Mi], i ∈ [1 : T ], in which Bi maps each sequence of Xi uniformly and indepen-
dently to the set [1 : Mi]. We denote the random variable Bt(Xt) by Bt. A random distributed binning
induces the following random pmf on the set X[1:T ] ×Z ×
∏T
t=1[1 : Mt],
P (x[1:T ], z, b[1:T ]) = pX[1:T ],Z(x[1:T ], z)
T∏
t=1
1{Bt(xt) = bt}.
The following theorem provides a lower bound on the expected fidelity between the induced pmf
P (b[1:T ], z) on the r.v.’s (B[1:T ], Z) and the desired pmf q(b[1:T ], z) = p
U (b[1:T ])p(z).
Theorem 7. The expected fidelity between the induced pmf P (b[1:T ], z) and the desired pmf q(b[1:T ], z) =
pU (b[1:T ])p(z) is bounded from below by
EF (P (b[1:T ], z); q(b[1:T ], z)) ≥ EX[1:T ]Z
√
1
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆[1:T ] MS2−h(XS |Z)
, (90)
where MS =
∏
v∈S Mv and the conditional information h(x|y) is defined by h(x|y) := log
1
pX|Y (x|y)
.
Proof. For the sake of brevity, we use the following simplified notations. We let V = [1 : T ]. Also, we let
1{B(xV) = bV} =
∏
t∈V 1{B(xt) = bt}. Also we use 1S to denote an all-one vector of length |S|. Now
consider
EF (P (bV , z); q(bV , z)) = E
∑
bV ,z
√∑
xV
p(xV , z)1{B(xV) = bV}. 1
MV
p(z) (91)
= E
∑
z
√
MV
∑
xV
p(xV , z)1{B(xV) = 1V}.p(z) (92)
= E
∑
xV ,z
p(xV , z)1{B(xV) = 1V}
√
MV∑
x¯V p(x¯V |z)1{B(x¯V) = 1V}
(93)
=
∑
xV ,z
p(xV , z)EB(xV )EB|B(xV )1{B(xV) = 1V}
√
MV∑
x¯V p(x¯V |z)1{B(x¯V) = 1V}
(94)
≥
∑
xV ,z
p(xV , z)EB(xV )1{B(xV) = 1V}
√
MV
EB|B(xV )
∑
x¯V p(x¯V |z)1{B(x¯V) = 1V}
(95)
≥
∑
xV ,z
p(xV , z)EB(xV )1{B(xV) = 1V}
√
MV∑
S⊆V M
−1
S p(xSc |z)1{B(xSc) = 1Sc}
(96)
=
∑
xV ,z
p(xV , z)
√
1∑
S⊆V MScp(xSc |z)
(97)
= EXVZ
√
1
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆V MS2−h(XS |Z)
(98)
where (92) is due to the symmetry and (95) follows from the Jensen inequality for the convex function
f(x) =
1√
x
on R+. To obtain (96) from (95), we partition the tuples in the set XV according to its
difference with the tuple xV . Define NS := {x¯V : x¯Sc = xSc ,∀v ∈ S : x¯v 6= xv}, i.e. given a subset
S ⊂ V and a sequence xV we define NS as the set of all sequences x¯V whose coordinate x¯v is equal to xv
if and only if v /∈ S. Then XV = ∪S⊆VNS and for each x¯V ∈ NS , we have
EB|B(xV )1(B(x¯V) = 1V) = EB(x¯V )|B(xV )1(B(x¯S) = 1S ,B(xSc) = 1Sc) = M−1S 1(B(xSc) = 1Sc),
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where we have used the fact that [B(x¯v) : v ∈ S] and B(xV) are mutually independent. Substituting this
in (95) gives,
EB|B(xV )
∑
x¯V
p(x¯V |z)1{B(x¯V) = 1V} =
∑
S⊆V
∑
x¯V∈NS
EB(x¯V )|B(xV )p(x¯V |z)1{B(x¯V) = 1V}
=
∑
S⊆V
∑
x¯V∈NS
p(x¯V |z)M−1S 1(B(xSc) = 1Sc)
≤
∑
S⊆V
∑
x¯S
p(x¯Sc , xS |z)M−1S 1(B(xSc) = 1Sc) (99)
=
∑
S⊆V
M−1S p(xS |z)1(B(xSc) = 1Sc), (100)
where (99) follows from the definition of NS by relaxing the constraint (x¯v 6= xv, v ∈ S) from its
definition.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1 as a corollary to Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 7, it suffices to prove that E
[
F (P (zn, b[1:T ]); p(z
n)pU (b[1:T ]))
] → 1, as
n→∞. Using Theorem 7 for pX[1:T ]Z = pXn[1:T ]Zn and Mt = 2nRt , we get
E
[
F (P (zn, b[1:T ]); p(z
n)pU (b[1:T ]))
] ≥ EXn
[1:T ]
Zn
√
1
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆V 2
nRS−h(XnS |Zn)
, (101)
where RS =
∑
t∈S Rt. We define the following typical set,
An :=
{
(xn[1:T ], z
n) : (xnS , z
n) ∈ An (S),∀S ⊆ [1 : T ]
}
,
where An (S) is defined as follows:
An (S) :=
{
(xnS , z
n) :
1
n
h(xnS |zn) ≥ H(XS |Z)− ,
}
, (102)
and  is an arbitrary positive number. By the weak law of large number, we have ∀S ⊆ [1 : T ],
limn→∞ p(An (S)) = 1. Hence we get limn→∞ p(An ) = 1. Using this definition, we find the following
lower bound on the RHS of (101),
EXn
[1:T ]
Zn
√
1
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆V 2
RS−h(XnS |Zn)
≥ EXn
[1:T ]
Zn
√
1
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆V 2
nRS−h(XnS |Zn)
1{(xn[1:T ], zn) ∈ An }
≥ EXn
[1:T ]
Zn
√
1
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆V 2n(RS−H(XS |Z)+)
1{(xn[1:T ], zn) ∈ An }
= p(An )
√
1
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆V 2n(RS−H(XS |Z)+)
→
√
1
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆V 2n(RS−H(XS |Z)+)
. (103)
Finally, if for each S ⊆ [1 : T ] we have RS < H(XS |Z)−  then (103) tends to one as n goes to infinity.
This concludes the proof.
Remark 11. The above proof can be easily extended to the case of general correlated sources pXn
[1:T ]
Zn
[25]. The general result for this general correlated sources is the same as the one for i.i.d. sources with
one exception, the average entropy should be replace by spectral inf-entropy. The proof is similar to
above, we only replace average entropy in the definition of An by spectral inf-entropy. In this case we
again have, limn→∞ p(An ) = 1.
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B Proof of Corollary 1
Without loss of generality, we can assume V = ∅. We prove this corollary by induction on T . For T = 1
the statement of the theorem is the same as the statement of Theorem 1. Assume that this corollary holds
for any k < T . If all the constraints of Theorem 1 are satisfied, then the proof follows from Theorem 1.
Thus, suppose that the constraint
∑
t∈S Rt < H(XS |Z) does not hold for some S ⊆ [1 : T ]. Note that by
(3) 1 /∈ S. On the other hand for any V ⊆ [2 : T ]−S, we have R1+
∑
t∈S Rt+
∑
t∈V Rt < H(X1XSXV |Z).
This and
∑
t∈S Rt > H(XS |Z) yields that for any V ⊆ [2 : T ] − S, R1 +
∑
t∈V Rt < H(X1XV |XSZ).
By induction assumption, this implies that B1, B[2:T ]−S and (XnS , Z
n) are nearly independent. More
precisely, we have
P (xnS , z
n, b1, b[2:T ]−S) ≈ pU (b1)P (xnS , zn, b[2:T ]−S).
Since BS is a function of XnS , we can introduce it to the above approximation. We have
P (xnS , z
n, b1, b[2:T ]−S , bS) ≈ pU (b1)P (xnS , zn, b[2:T ]−S , bS).
Using the second item in part 1 of 4 gives
P (zn, b1, b[2:T ]−S , bS︸ ︷︷ ︸
b[1:T ]
) ≈ pU (b1)P (zn, b[2:T ]−S , bS︸ ︷︷ ︸
b[2:T ]
),
which is the desired approximation.
C Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of the first part can be found in [6]. Next consider the second part. To prove this, we bound
above the expectation EpX
∥∥pY |X − qY |X∥∥1 as follows:
EpX
∥∥pY |X − qY |X∥∥1 = ∑
x
pX(x)
(
1
2
∑
y
∣∣pY |X(y|x)− qY |X(y|x)∣∣
)
≤ 1
2
∑
x,y
∣∣pX(x)pY |X(y|x)− qX(x)qY |X(y|x)∣∣+ 12 ∑
x,y
∣∣qX(x)qY |X(y|x)− pX(x)qY |X(y|x)∣∣
=
∥∥pXpY |X − qXqY |X∥∥1 + ∥∥qXqY |X − pXqY |X∥∥1
(a)
=
∥∥pXpY |X − qXqY |X∥∥1 + ‖qX − pX‖1
(b)
≤ 2 ∥∥pXpY |X − qXqY |X∥∥1
≤ 2, (104)
where in the steps (a) and (b) we use the first part of this lemma. Thus there exists a specified x ∈ X
such that 2) hold. To show 2′) we use Markov’s inequality
pX
(
{x ∈ X : ∥∥pY |X=x − qY |X=x∥∥1 > √}) ≤ EpX
∥∥pY |X − qY |X∥∥1√

≤ 2√.
Finally, consider the third part of the lemma. By the triangular inequality and the first part of the
lemma, we have
E
∥∥PXPY |X −QXQY |X∥∥1 ≤ E∥∥PXPY |X − PXQY |X∥∥1 + E∥∥PXQY |X −QXQY |X∥∥1
= E
∥∥PXPY |X − PXQY |X∥∥1 + E ‖PX −QX‖1
≤ + δ. (105)
D Proof of Lemma 5
We have EqXY d(X,Y ) =
∑
x,y qXY (x, y)d(x, y) ≤
∑
x,y pXY (x, y)d(x, y)+
∑
x,y |qXY (x, y)− pXY (x, y)| d(x, y) ≤
D + dmax
∑
x,y |qXY (x, y)− pXY (x, y)| ≤ D + dmax.
40
E Completing Proof of Theorem 6
In this appendix we prove that the following two approximations are sufficient to approximate the pmf
in (71) by (72),
P (m, f) ≈ pU (m)pU (f) (106)
P (fr,(k), yˆ
n
r,([1:k−1]), x
n
r,([1:k]), y
n
r,(k)) ≈ pU (fr,(k))P (yˆnr,([1:k−1]), xnr,([1:k]), ynr,(k)), b ∈ [1 : B − 1]. (107)
We prove this by induction on the number of blocks. That is, we show that the following approximation
holds for each b = 0, 1, · · · , B by induction on b.
Pˆ (xnB, xnr,([1:b+1]), y
n
r,([1:b]), y
n
([1:b]),z
n
([1:b]), yˆ
n
r,([1:b]),m, f, fr,([1:b]))
≈ P (xnB, xnr,([1:b+1]), ynr,([1:b]), yn([1:b]), zn([1:b]), yˆnr,([1:b]),m, f, fr,([1:b])).
(108)
It is obvious that the case b = B is the desired approximation. First, consider the base induction
b = 0. In this case, the approximation is reduced to P (xnB, xnr,(1),m, f) ≈ Pˆ (xnB, xnr,(1),m, f), which is
satisfied by the assumption P (m, f) ≈ pU (m)pU (f) and the first part of Lemma 4. Now suppose that
the induction assumption holds for b = k − 1. We prove the induction assumption for b = k. Consider
Pˆ (xnB, xnr,([1:k]),y
n
r,([1:k]), y
n
([1:k]), z
n
([1:k]), yˆ
n
r,([1:k−1]),m, f, fr,([1:k]))
= Pˆ (xnB, xnr,([1:k]), y
n
r,([1:k−1]), y
n
([1:k−1]), z
n
([1:k−1]), yˆ
n
r,([1:k−1]),m, f, fr,([1:k−1])))
× p(ynr,(k), yn(k), zn(k)|xn(k), xnr,(k))pU (fr,(k)) (109)
≈ P (xnB, xnr,([1:k]), ynr,([1:k−1]), yn([1:k−1]), zn([1:k−1]), yˆnr,([1:k−1]),m, f, fr,([1:k−1])))
× p(ynr,(k), yn(k), zn(k)|xn(k), xnr,(k))pU (fr,(k)) (110)
= P (xnB, xnr,([1:k]), y
n
r,([1:k]), y
n
([1:k]), z
n
([1:k]), yˆ
n
r,([1:k−1]),m, f, fr,([1:k−1])))p
U (fr,(k)) (111)
= pU (fr,(k))P (yˆ
n
r,([1:k−1]), x
n
r,([1:k]), y
n
r,(k))
P (xnB, ynr,([1:k−1]), y
n
([1:k]), z
n
([1:k]),m, f, fr,([1:k−1])|yˆnr,([1:k−1]), xnr,([1:k]), ynr,(k))
≈ P (fr,(k), yˆnr,([1:k−1]), xnr,([1:k]), ynr,(k))
P (xnB, ynr,([1:k−1]), y
n
([1:k]), z
n
([1:k]),m, f, fr,([1:k−1])|yˆnr,([1:k−1]), xnr,([1:k]), ynr,(k)) (112)
= P (xnB, xnr,([1:k]), y
n
r,([1:k]), y
n
([1:k]), z
n
([1:k]), yˆ
n
r,([1:k−1]),m, f, fr,([1:k])), (113)
where equation (109) is due to pmf factorization (72), equation (110) follows from induction assumption
and the first part of Lemma 4, equation (111) is due to pmf factorization (71), equation (112) follows
from the approximation (106),and equation (113) is due to the Markov chain
Fr,(b) −
(
Yˆ nr,([1:k−1]), X
n
r,([1:k]), Y
n
r,(k)
)
−
(
XnB, Y nr,([1:k−1]), Y
n
([1:k]), Z
n
([1:k]),M, F, Fr,([1:k−1])
)
,
which is satisfied by (71). Finally, the desired approximation (108) for b = k is implied by the pmf
factorizations (71) and (72), the approximation (113) and the first part of Lemma 4. This completes the
induction proof.
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